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Conventional wisdom portrays contracts as static distillations of parties’ 
shared intent at some discrete point in time. In reality, however, contract terms 
evolve in response to their environments, including new laws, legal 
interpretations, and economic shocks. While several legal scholars have 
offered stylized accounts of this evolutionary process, we still lack a coherent, 
general theory that broadly captures the dynamics of real-world contracting 
practice. This paper advances such a theory, in which the evolution of contract 
terms is a byproduct of several key features, including efficiency concerns, 
information, and sequential learning by attorneys who negotiate several deals 
over time. Each of these factors contributes to the underlying evolutionary 
process, and their relative prominence bears directly on the speed, direction, 
and desirability of how contractual innovations diffuse. Using a formal model 
of bargaining in a sequence of similar transactions, we demonstrate how 
different evolutionary patterns can manifest over time, in both desirable and 
undesirable directions. We then take these insights to real-world dataset of 
over 2,000 merger agreements negotiated over the last two decades, tracking 
the adoption of several contractual clauses, including pandemic-related terms, 
#MeToo provisions, CFIUS conditions, and reverse termination fees. Our 
analysis suggests that there is not a “one size fits all” paradigm for contractual 
evolution; rather, the constituent forces affecting term evolution appear 
manifest in varying strengths across differing circumstances. We highlight 
several constructive applications of our framework, including the study of 
contract negotiation unfolds when price cannot easily be adjusted, and how to 
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Most corporate transactions win deservedly scant attention in the popular 
press. But every so often, one becomes the centerpiece of cocktail-party 
conversation. And just such a deal came along in November 2019, when iconic U.S. 
luxury goods maker Tiffany & Co. disclosed that it was being acquired in a $16.2 
billion transaction by Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy (“LVMH”), the French luxury 
goods giant.1 When the tie-up was announced, there were plenty of reasons for 
optimism. The deal came in the middle of the longest running economic expansion 
in U.S. history,2 and in all respects it looked like the latest blockbuster marriage in 
a string of shrewd acquisitions by LVMH’s Chairman, Bernard Arnault, whose 
storied deal-making had fortified the LVMH empire.3  If there were any questions 
surrounding the deal, it was about whether LVMH could pull Tiffany out of its 
longstanding struggle to attract younger clientele.4 Brushing such concerns aside, 
LVMH’s CFO confidently quipped that “[l]ove will prevail.”5  
LVMH and Tiffany’s love story, however, was star-crossed from the start. 
Only three months after the deal was announced—and well before its scheduled 
closing—the coronavirus pandemic overwhelmed the global economy, ushering in 
 
1See LVMH Reaches Agreement with Tiffany & Co., LVMH (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.lvmh.com/news-documents/press-releases/lvmh-reaches-agreement-with-tiffany-co/; 
see also Holly Ellyatt, LVMH Confirms Deal to Acquire Tiffany for $16.2 Billion, CNBC (Nov. 25, 
2019, 2:09 AM); Roberta Naas, LVMH Acquires Tiffany & Co. for $16.2 Billion, FORBES (Nov. 26, 
2019, 10:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertanaas/2019/11/26/lvmh-aquires-tiffany--co-
for-162--billion/?sh=5761d13c69ab. 
2 See Business Cycle Dating, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
https://www.nber.org/research/business-cycle-dating (last visited FEB. 26, 2021); see also Carmen 
Reinicke, The US Economic Expansion Is Now the Longest in History, MARKETS INSIDER (July 2, 
2019, 1:06 PM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/us-economy-expansion-is-now-
the-longest-in-history-2019-7-1028325678; David John Marotta, Longest Economic Expansion in 
United States History, FORBES (Jan 21, 2020, 12:47 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2020/01/21/longest-economic-expansion-in-united-
states-history/?sh=7fda875a62a 
3 See Vanessa Friedman, Bernard Arnault Just Bought Tiffany. Who Is He?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/fashion/bernard-arnault-tiffany-lvmh.html. 
4 See Chauncey Alcorn, Tiffany Needs to Attract Millennials. The Company that Hired Rihanna and 
A$AP Rocky Wants to Help, CNN BUSINESS (Oct. 29, 2019, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/29/business/tiffany-lvmh-millennials; Subrat Patnaik & Siddharth 
Cavale, Tiffany’s ‘Old-World Luxury’ Fails to Charm Millennials, REUTERS (May 26, 2016, 2:24 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiffany-results-competition/tiffanys-old-world-luxury-
fails-to-charm-millennials-idUSKCN0YH2IV; Vauhini Vara, Tiffany’s Sparkly Surge Reflects a 
Divided Moment in America, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/08/tiffanys-sparkly-surge-reflects-a-divided-
moment-in-america/568846/ (“As recently as last year, Tiffany, like a lot of luxury brands, was 
struggling to get Millennials to buy its products.”); Dora Mekouar, Millennials Not Interested in 
Tiffany Jewelry, Gap Clothes, VOA NEWS (Feb. 25, 2020, 8:13 AM), 
https://www.voanews.com/usa/all-about-america/millennials-not-interested-tiffany-jewelry-gap-
clothes. 
5 Amy Tsang & Vanessa Friedman, Luxury Giant LVMH to Buy Tiffany for $16.2 Billion, N.Y. 
Times (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/business/lvmh-tiffany-deal.html 
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the deepest economic contraction in modern memory.6 Many of LVMH’s and 
Tiffany’s locations were shuttered by state and local authorities, with no 
dependable timeline for reopening.7 A transaction that once looked like a rocket 
ship now more closely resembled a train wreck, with many observers quietly 
predicting that LVMH would start  looking for a way out.8 
In the end, it was not love that prevailed; rather, it was a contract. Buried 
deep within the 70-page agreement that memorialized the LVMH-Tiffany merger 
was a provision that provided LVMH with the potential offramp it so desperately 
sought. One of the conditions to LVMH’s obligation to close the transaction was 
that Tiffany’s business would not have experienced a “material adverse effect,” the 
equivalent of a force majeure (or “Act of God”) provision that appears in myriad 
other contracts.9 LVMH seized upon the language, declaring that the pandemic had, 
in fact, visited a material adverse effect on Tiffany’s operations, and LVMH 
therefore had the right to walk away from the deal.10  
 
6  See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, Coronavirus Recession Looms, Its Course ‘Unrecognizable,’ N.Y 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/business/economy/coronavirus-
recession.html; Alan Rappeport & Jeanna Smialek, I.M.F. Predicts Worst Downtown Since the 
Great Depression, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/us/politics/ 
coronavirus-economy-recession-depression.html; Press Release, The World Bank, COVID-19 to 
Plunge Global Economy into Worst Recession Since World War II (Jun. 8, 2020), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/06/08/covid-19-to-plunge-global-
economy-into-worst-recession-since-world-war-ii. 
7 See Reuters Staff, Tiffany & Co to Temporarily Shut Several Stores, Cuts Hours at Others, 
REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
tiffany/tiffany-co-to-temporarily-shut-several-stores-cuts-hours-at-others-idUSKBN2143JA; Kim 
Bhasin, LVMH Says Revenue Has Dropped as Much as 20% Due to Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG, 
(Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-27/lvmh-says-revenue-has-
dropped-as-much-as-20-due-to-coronavirus; Patrick M. Graham, Tiffany Indicates Coronavirus 
Outbreak Will Cause Significant Hit to 2020 Results, PROACTIVE, (Mar. 20, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.proactiveinvestors.com/companies/news/915433/tiffany-indicates-coronavirus-
outbreak-will-cause-significant-hit-to-2020-results-915433.html; John Harrington & Samuel 
Stebbins, 30 of America’s Iconic Businesses that Closed Due to Coronavirus, USA TODAY (Apr. 
10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ money/2020/04/10/businesses-closed-
coronavirus/111526546/; Jonathan Garber, Tiffany & Co. Loses $65M as Coronavirus Shutters 
Stores, FOX BUS. (June 9, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/tiffany-co-coronavirus-
loss-q1-2020. 
8 Lauren Hirsch & Elizabeth Paton, Tiffany’s $16 Billion Sale Falls Apart in Face of Pandemic and 
Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/business/lvmh-tiffany-
deal-lawsuit.html. 
9 Tiffany & Co. and LVMH Moet Hennessy-Louis Vuitton, Agreement and Plan of Merger, Article 
8.2 (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98246/000119312519299997/ 
d840067dex21.htm. 
10 See Press Release, LVMH (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.lvmh.com/news-documents/press-
releases/press-release-09092020/; see also Lauren Hirsch & Elizabeth Paton, Tiffany’s $16 Billion 
Sale Falls Apart in Face of Pandemic and Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/ business/lvmh-tiffany-deal-lawsuit.html; Reuters Staff, 
Timeline: LVMH Calls Off $16 Billion Tiffany Takeover, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2020, 10:27 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiffany-m-a-lvmh-timeline/timeline-lvmh-calls-off-16-billion-
tiffany-takeover-idINKBN2602P0; Amelia Lucas & Lauren Thomas, LVMH Scraps $16.2 Billion 
Deal with Tiffany, CNBC (Sept. 9, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/09/lvmh-
scraps-16point2-billion-deal-with-tiffany.html; Anne D’Innocenzio, Luxury Goods Giant LVMH 
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Tiffany responded the way that jilted lovers sometimes do: by litigating, in 
the Delaware Court of Chancery, where it argued that the force majeure provision 
had several exclusions that prevented LVMH from treating COVID-19 as a material 
adverse effect.11 LVMH countered by observing that while there were indeed 
several express exclusions pertaining to natural and political disasters, the contract 
was silent as to public health crises in general (and COVID in particular). In fact, 
they argued, the meticulous inclusion of a list of very specific, express exclusions 
made it all the more convincing that pandemic-related events had been deliberately 
omitted from the list of exclusions.12 
Holding aside the merits of these arguments, the overall economics of the 
merger still appeared strong, and the costs and risks of litigating the outcome were 
appreciable. It was therefore unsurprising that in late 2020, the parties returned to 
the negotiating table to re-cut the deal. They ultimately agreed to shave the purchase 
price by about a half-billion dollars, short-circuiting the uncertain outcome of 
LVMH’s efforts to escape the deal.13 Although Tiffany’s dowry had shrunk 
considerably, it was not to suffer the Whistledown-worthy14 humiliation of being 
left at the altar.15  
While the LVMH/Tiffany dispute made international headlines, its basic 
facts recount a saga that has played out repeatedly during the pandemic. Over the 
last year, an unprecedented series of corporate transactions have immersed the 
Delaware courts in material adverse effect claims.16 And beyond the context of 
 
Cancels $14.5B Deal for Tiffany, WASH. POST (Sept 9, 2020, 6:02 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/lvmh-drops-145b-deal-for-tiffany-cites-us-tariffs-
threat/2020/09/09/4c7d4cbc-f294-11ea-8025-5d3489768ac8_story.html. 
11  Verified Complaint, Tiffany & Co. v. LVMH Moët Hennessy-Louis Vuitton, No. 2020-0768 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2020).  
12 Verified Counterclaim and Answer to Verified Complaint, Tiffany & Co. v. LVMH Moët 
Hennessy-Louis Vuitton, No. 2020-0768 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2020). 
13  See Press Release, LVMH, Tiffany and LVMH Modify Merger Price (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://www.lvmh.com/news-documents/press-releases/tiffany-and-lvmh-modify-merger-price/; 
see also Sarah White & Silvia Aloisi, LVMH and Tiffany End Luxury Battle, Cut Price on $16 
Billion Takeover, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2020, 2:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/tiffany-m-a-
lvmh/lvmh-and-tiffany-end-luxury-battle-cut-price-on-16-billion-takeover-idUSKBN27E13L; 
David Dawkins, Billionaire Bernard Arnault Snags $400 Million Price Reduction in High-Risk 
Tiffany Takeover Talks, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2020, 7:32 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddawkins/2020/10/29/billionaire-bernard-arnault-snags-400-
million-price-reduction-in-high-risk-tiffany-takeover-talks/?sh=70b0ca56355b; Vanessa Friedman 
& Elizabeth Paton, Tiffany Deal Is a Signature Move by the Sun Tzu of Luxury, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/business/bernard-arnault-lvmh-tiffany-
battle.html. 
14 See James Poniewozik, ‘Bridgerton’ Is a Sparkly Period Piece With a Difference, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/arts/television/bridgerton-review.html.  
15 The deal closed on Jan 7, 2021. Tiffany & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 7, 2021), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000098246/000119312521004213/d301758d8k.htm; 
Press Release, LVMH, LVMH Completes the Acquisition of Tiffany & Co. (Jan. 7, 2021), 
https://www.lvmh.com/news-documents/press-releases/lvmh-completes-the-acquisition-of-tiffany-
and-co/. 
16 See, e.g., MXY Holdings LLC v. Green Growth Brands Inc., No. 2020-0296 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 
2020); AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotel & Resorts One LLC, No. 2020-0310 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 
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mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”), similar claims arising out of changed 
circumstances increased dramatically in many commercial and non-commercial 
settings, ranging from supply chains to higher education to Hollywood.17  
 For lawyers and those studying the law, part of the allure behind these 
disputes stems from their foundational origins in basic contract law. Whether it 
pertains to a corporate combination,18 a conceiving cow,19 a closed canal,20 or a 
cancelled coronation,21 courts have long struggled to assess whether, when and how 
the law should intervene in a contractual risk allocation during moments of 
unanticipated surprise or severe economic dislocation.22 But the role of the law in 
this process is not limited to litigated outcomes. Even before the phalanx of 
Tiffany/LVMH lawyers filed their complaints, a different set of legal actors— 
transactional lawyers—played a critical role in crafting the language of the written 
contract itself. Their language was destined to be parsed in excruciating detail to 
determine whether and how it allocated risks and uncertainties around yet-to-unfold 
events.  
This contract design task is no mean feat: The choices made by these 
transactional attorneys can tip the balance of risks and incentives for trillions of 
dollars’ worth of agreements as economic conditions change. And in doing so, 
drafters must carefully consider whether a fluidly evolving environment requires 
them to write new, yet-untested provisions to address each emerging risk. 
Interestingly, the lawyers making these decisions often work alone, with little input 
from other stakeholders such as CEOs, CFOs, boards or investment bankers. When 
lawyers hammer out these terms, those other stakeholders have long left the 
 
2020); Realogy Holdings Corp. v. SIRVA Worldwide, Inc., No. 2020-0311 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 
2020); Pascal v. Czerwinski, No. 2020-0320 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2020); Neumann v. Softbank Group 
Corp., No. 2020-0329 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2020); XHR Santa Barbara LLC v. SBG US Holdings PTE. 
LTD., No. 2020-0395 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2020); Yatra Online, Inc. v. Ebix, Inc., No. 2020-0444 
(Del. Ch. June 5, 2020); SPay, Inc. v. Stack Media Inc., No. 2020-0540 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2020); AG 
Resource Holdings, LLC v. Terral, No. 2020-0850 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020). 
17 See Tim McCarthy, Covid-19 and Force Majeure: A Closer Look at the Supply Chain Clause of 
the Moment, IndustryWeek (Jul. 9, 2020), https://www.industryweek.com/supply-chain/supplier-
relationships/article/ 21136263/covid19-and-force-majeure-a-closer-look-at-the-supply-chain-
clause-of-the-moment; Jessica Everett-Garcia, Keith Miller, T. Markus Funk & Evelyn Pang, These 
Defenses May Help Universities in Covid-19 Lawsuits, Bloomberg Insights (Aug. 14, 2020), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-these-defenses-may-help-universities-in-
covid-19-lawsuits; David Robb & Nellie Andreeva, SAG-AFTRA Addresses Talks with Studios on 
“Applicability of Force Majeure” for Actors Impacted by COVID-19 Shutdown, Deadline (Apr. 23, 
2020), https://deadline.com/2020/04/sag-aftra-talks-studios-on-applicability-of-force-majeure-
actors-impacted-by-covid-19-shutdown-1202916815/; Lee Brenner & Adam Kwon, How 
Hollywood COVID-19 Force Majeure Claims May Play Out, Law360 (March 27, 2020), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1254848/how-hollywood-covid-19-force-majeure-claims-may-
play-out. 
18 Hexion Specialty Chem’s., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A. 2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
19 Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).  
20 Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d. 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
21 Krell v Henry, 2 KB 740 (1903). 
22 Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 527 (1985) 
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negotiation table, satisfied that they could reach a consensus on the most essential 
attributes of the deal, such as the price.  
What makes this dynamic especially compelling is how frequently it 
unfolds across many different contexts. It applies not only to M&A agreements, but 
also to sovereign debt,23 choice-of-forum provisions,24 financings, and countless 
other contracts where performance takes place far into an unknown future. In each 
instance, the lion’s share of negotiation points is delegated to lawyers. As these 
actors move from client to client (and contract to contract), they function as 
important conduits through which contracting conventions—and thus market 
practices—unfold and evolve over time.  
And yet this evolutionary process is rarely studied by scholars. To be sure, 
the evolutionary behavior of prices is a familiar topic among economists, who have 
developed elaborate theories to explain and predict such movements.25 And among 
legal scholars, there is no shortage of attention paid to the evolution of legal 
doctrine, for its interesting, if sometimes controversial evolutionary traits. But the 
tools of private ordering that precede, animate and actuate the structure of the 
myriad other (non-price) terms within contracts are generally not part of the 
discussion. And yet, understanding the nature of contract innovation strikes at the 
heart of contract law and policy.  
At the same time, the academic literature on contract term evolution remains 
modest, fragmented and highly context-specific. Some have analogized contract 
terms to prices, arguing that they evolve efficiently when exposed to market 
pressures and execution by rational parties.26 Others have countered that contracts 
simply do not have the same exposure to market dynamics, with some advancing 
the thesis that evolutionary movements are virtually non-existent, displaying a 
staunch rigidity akin to a “black hole.”27 Yet others have used nearly the same 
observation about the lack of market discipline to argue in favor of a “churning” 
 
23 See Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Anticipating Venezuela’s Debt Crisis: Hidden 
Holdouts and the Problem of Pricing Collective Action Clauses, 100 B.U. L. REV. 253 (2020); 
Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private and 
Public Company Transactions, 2020 WISC. L. REV. 629; Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. 
Scott, Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation?, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 
(2018); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial 
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017); Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, The Pricing of Non-Price Terms 
in Sovereign Bonds: The Case of the Greek Guarantees, 1 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 1 (2016); Stephen J. 
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(2013); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in 
Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131 (2012). 
24Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete Contracts, 88 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 1–80 (2021). 
25 LÉON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (1900); Gérard Debreu, Excess-Demand 
Functions, 1 J. MATH. ECON. 15 (1974); Hugo Sonnenschein & Wayne Shafer, Market Demand and 
Excess Demand Functions, 2 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 671 (1982). 
26 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
YALE L. J. 541 (2003). This assumes, of course, the same sorts of conditions that lead to pricing 
efficiency – i.e., that there are no distortions in the market such as the abuses of market power that 
antitrust law is meant to address.  
27 Stephen J. Choi et al., The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L. J. 1–78 
(2017–2018). 
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effect, with rapid mutations that reflect incentives of the drafters that stand in direct 
conflict of their clients’ interests. Some have even proposed that transactional 
lawyers make unnecessary modifications simply to increase their billable hours.28 
But beyond these stylized accounts, we still have surprisingly scant 
knowledge of the forces behind the evolution of contractual terms. Can we predict 
when, whether, and how new “mutations” to contract terms arrive, and under what 
circumstances they will make substantial incursions on contracting practices? What 
role do lawyers play in this evolutionary process, either by promoting the diffusion 
of a new term or by hindering it? And if lawyers do play a role, do they create or 
destroy value in the process? 
The answers to these questions are vitally important but thus far elusive, for 
several interrelated reasons: First, we still lack a general theory to think about how 
contracts evolve over time, and in particular how this process is intermediated by 
the actors who structure these terms. And second, empirical evidence for 
contractual evolution is often limited to isolated examples, preventing us from 
testing or calibrating a more general theory. However, having a broad 
understanding of contractual evolution is of particular importance in today’s 
volatile environment, where the economic, political and social milieu is undergoing 
significant and rapid change. 
In this Article, we marshal both theoretical and empirical tools to study 
contractual evolution.29 On the theoretical side, we develop a general, holistic 
model of contract structuring where contract provisions are progressively embraced 
or abandoned by a community of lawyers acting sequentially. Many contracts with 
significant economic stakes fall into this category, including financings, asset 
purchases, acquisitions and licensing arrangements.  Our model helps show how a 
variety of factors interact to affect whether and under what circumstances a 
contractual “mutation” will be embraced by the industry. In particular, we show 
that such diffusion is a function of several inputs, including information, 
experience, and lawyer networks. When lawyers are well-positioned to ascertain 
the value-creating attributes of a mutation, contracts can evolve quickly and 
efficiently to match changing environments. In other cases, legal actors need to gain 
experience with a new mutation over time, a constraint that can slow its 
evolutionary trajectory and even cause some degree of mismatch. Throughout this 
process, the structure of lawyer networks can play an important role, providing 
them a conduit to transmit their experiences to one another, as well as to sharpen 
 
28 Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEORGE 
WASHINGTON L. REV. 57–93 (2017). 
29 Note that our focus is on negotiated commercial agreements and not contracts of adhesion often 
used in the consumer context. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Learning in 
Standard Form Contracts: Theory and Evidence (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 18-11, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3133791; Kevin E. Davis & Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, Contracting for Personal Data, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 662 (2019); Yannis Bakos, 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer 
Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & 
Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (2013).  
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their expertise. Using simulations to analyze our model, we generate several 
predictions about how mutations are likely to manifest over time, what diffusion 
paths those mutations might take, how desirable those paths are, and whether 
lawyers appear to be adding value to the process. 
But our exercise extends beyond simulating outcomes from a model. In a 
second step, we export the intuitions acquired from our simulations to the real 
world. Using a large dataset of over 2,000 M&A transactions that we hand collected 
and labeled, we track the evolution of a series of important contractual innovations, 
and the degree to which they are embraced or rejected by the networks of lawyers 
who structure them.30 Our analysis strongly suggests that not all contract terms are 
created equal within our research design: we uncover evidence that the distinct 
evolutionary paths identified by our model also play out in actual market practice. 
Some terms clearly bear the markers of well-informed lawyers tailoring their 
contracts to the clients they represent. Others, however, demonstrate adoption 
patterns that seem unlikely to be highly bespoke. In addition, some diffusion paths 
combine more than one pattern, such as where a shock upends existing practices 
and spurs new innovation in the market. M&A agreements do not follow a single 
evolutionary path but rather many.       
Our analysis has important implications for law, policy, and future research. 
Foremost, our analysis can help highlight when and whether lawyers add significant 
value to deals. They also help us to understand the conditions under which legal 
term innovation is most likely to occur in practice, and whether such innovations 
are more likely to be temporary or truly durable contributions.  Our analysis may 
also shed light on how courts should interpret such language, not only when it is 
included in a contract, but also when it is left out.      
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides an 
overview of differing accounts of contract term evolution in the legal literature, 
showing that at present it is largely a set of stylized canonical intuitions that talk 
past one another. Part II introduces our own theory and model of contract evolution.  
It combines many of the features of the existing arguments within a single 
framework. We then use simulations to show how different diffusion patterns can 
arise under varying contractual environments, such as under a highly concentrated 
or a dispersed market for the provision of legal services. Part III applies these 
insights to real-world data involving significant M&A agreements, where we track 
the adoption and diffusion of a variety of contract mutations over the years, 
including pandemic-related force majeure clauses, #MeToo provisions, and reverse 
 
30 We plan to make this data set – including the raw corpus from which the labels are generated –  
publicly available on or before publication of this article. These contractual terms include the 
following: pandemic-related force majeure provisions discussed above #MeToo (or “Weinstein”) 
provisions, where a target company represents that no allegations of sexual harassment or 
misconduct have been made against its senior executives; CFIUS provisions, which allocate the risk 
of national security review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States; reverse 
termination fees, which specify an amount the buyer is to pay the target company if the buyer 
terminates the deal for certain reasons; top-up options, which allow a bidder to effect a short form 
merger in situations where a tender offer does not result in the buyer achieving an ownership interest 
over 90%; and choice of law and forum provisions.      
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termination fees. Our analysis confirms that there is great heterogeneity in the 
diffusion paths of our example terms, and a single one-size-fits-all stylized account 
is likely not appropriate. Part IV discusses a variety of implications of our analysis 
for both contract theory and negotiation theory. A final section concludes. A 
technical appendix includes some of the formal derivations of our modeling results 
for the technically minded reader. 
I. Theories of Contract Evolution and Their Limits 
The innovation and diffusion of contracts is a topic that is seldom discussed 
in traditional contract law. As law students learn each year in their first-year 
Contracts courses, a central, if somewhat idealized principle of Anglo-American 
contract law is that contract terms are thought to embody and reflect the intentions 
of the parties who negotiated them.31 Under this idealized account, the terms of an 
agreement are mechanically customized by the parties to channel their particular 
intent. Although certain special types of written instruments, including mass-
market consumer contracts, are a recognized exception to this account, for the rest 
it is still common to think of large transactions of significant size to comport with 
the traditional narrative. 
Consequently, it can seem misplaced to talk about the “innovation” of 
contract terms and the diffusion of new contractual language within large, 
significant, dickered transactions. After all, to negotiate a contract is to breathe life 
into new terms, and thus every contract is in some ways an innovation, with no 
necessary tether to what came before.        
For the same reasons, the idea of a “diffusion” of a new contract term also 
seems an odd fit within the standard paradigm. While parties negotiating separate 
agreements may coincidentally employ similar contractual language as did their 
predecessors, doing so seems hardly to describe a diffusion process. By definition, 
tailoring a contract to each specific deal implies that early contracts should have 
little to no effect on successors. Viewed in this sense, if two deals converged on 
similar (or identical) contractual terms, it would simply be an accident of fate—
much like Newton and Leibniz each independently stumbled upon key principles 
of calculus in the 17th century.32 
However, even for large, seemingly bespoke deals, the idea that terms are 
rigorously reset de novo for each transaction misses the mark. In settings where 
transactions with facially similar characteristics occur frequently, there are several 
potential benefits to standardizing and/or emulating contractual language from one 
deal to the next. First, reusing “boilerplate” language allows the designer to exploit 
economies of scale, like Ford Motor Company accomplished a century ago with the 
standardized design of the Model T.33 Not unlike an automobile, there can be many 
 
31 Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009). 
32 See, e.g., Meli D. B. Equivalence and Priority: Newton versus Leibniz: Including Leibniz's 
Unpublished Manuscripts on the Principia (1993). 
33 Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77–86 (2011–2012). 
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moving parts in a large transactional instrument. And for many of those parts, the 
benefits of customization may not justify the costs.   
Second, standardized contract language can lead to greater certainty in 
interpretation should a dispute about the language land in front of a court or 
arbitrator. Judicial precedents are a public good, and consequently familiar terms 
have a much greater chance of being able to draw on such interpretive jurisprudence 
with confidence. Courts have long been cognizant of this externality of precedents, 
and they have emphasized the importance of uniformity and predictability of 
boilerplate language—a benefit that is not lost on contracting parties as well.34 
Finally, the evolutionary path of contract terms from deal to deal may be a 
particularly good way for lawyers to learn from each other and from their prior 
selves. A well-designed contract provision is more likely to withstand the test of 
time, and its serial emulation may constitute a diagnostic signal of its quality.  By 
the same token, if a novel form of contractual language diffuses throughout a 
market, it can send an informational signal along the way as lawyers incorporate it 
into their own deals. As Paul Cravath put it rather floridly, over a century ago, such 
terms may reflect “the experience and prophetic vision of a great many able 
lawyers.”35  
By the same token, standardization will necessarily cause the language of a 
contract to diverge from specific intentions of the parties to the agreement.36 No 
longer completely tethered to the immediate circumstance, contractual language 
can take on a life of its own, transcending the bargaining context of any given deal. 
Over time, in fact, the widespread adoption of a boilerplate provision among 
participants in a market can lead to extreme outcomes. In cases where the term is 
deeply entrenched, the cost of switching to a new and untested version of the term 
can become prohibitive.37 And in such cases, contractual language becomes highly 
path dependent, potentially undermining the market’s ability to embrace good 
innovations while weeding out bad ones. 
What factors lead to path dependency in some situations but rapid evolution 
and diffusion in others? The research on that question has produced a number of 
explanations. Some view the pace of contractual evolution as “too cold”—i.e., 
standardized terms become frozen in time so that even momentous shocks in the 
market struggle to stimulate a chance in contractual language. Others posit that 
contract evolution is “too hot”—i.e., transactional lawyers constantly “churn” 
contractual language, adding clauses here and tinkering with terms there, with little 
purpose other than to increase the client’s bill. That said, the most traditional story 
 
34 See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982). 
35 MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3 1/2 MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE 
LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2013) (quoting Paul D. Cravath, Reorganizations of Corporations, 
in 1 LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 153, 178 (N.Y.B. Ass’n ed. 1917)). 
36 Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis, 132 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1135–1219 (2018–2019); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as 
Statute, 104 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1129–1173 (2006). 
37 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting 
(or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 727 (1997). 
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of contracting posits that contract evolution is (approximately) efficient, yielding 
to the forces of market competition or effective organizational routines within law 
firms. In that sense, it can be described as the “just right” approach. We discuss 
each in turn below. 
 
A. “Too Cold”: When Contract Terms Become Frozen in Time 
The first category, which has attracted the greatest amount of recent 
scholarly attention, focuses on scenarios in which contractual innovation is 
inhibited. According to this theory, sophisticated companies and their lawyers 
sometimes fail to improve on their contractual terms, leading to inefficiency and, 
at times, catastrophe.38  
One significant branch of this literature argues that the expectations of other 
participants in the market contribute to a contractual “lock-in.” Parties expect to see 
certain standardized terms in a deal.39 One reason is familiarity: As it becomes more 
widely adopted, the value of a contract term becomes more certain, compared to 
the less certain value of idiosyncratic terms, particularly as courts, arbitrators and 
other third-party actors interpret them over time.40 A related reason for lock-in is 
that deviations from standard, or “market,” terms may be viewed as a negative 
signal of a party’s quality. In many transactions, information about a party’s ability 
and inclination to fully perform their contractual obligations is not easily observed. 
If a party proposes a novel formation of a standard contractual term during 
negotiations, their counterparts may become suspicious that the non-standard 
proposal is indicative of an undisclosed (and therefore likely negative) hazard.41 As 
a result, parties will stick to standard terms to avoid giving the impression that they 
pose a heightened risk for breach. 
To combat contractual lock-ins, innovation sometimes requires concerted 
action in the market. In a game-theoretic sense, market participants’ choice to 
abandon a standard term for a new formulation is a type of coordination problem.42 
And a central feature of coordination games is the notion of strategic 
complementarity—i.e., one player’s incentive to take a certain strategy increases as 
others take that same strategy.43 For agents to find it in their interests to pursue the 
new strategy, they must be convinced of widespread agreement over the change, 
either explicit or tacit, among other participants in the market—here, an agreement 
to shift from an old standard term to a new one. As the size of the market grows, 
 
38 Gulati & Scott, supra note 35.  
39 Standardized terms become more useful as their adoption within a market grows, a phenomenon 
familiar to many technologies, such as operating systems or hardware interfaces. Douglas Gale, 
Standard Securities, 59 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 731–755 (1992); Marcel Kahan & 
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of 
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 730 (1997). 
40 Gale, supra note 39. 
41 Id. 
42 See THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978); THOMAS SCHELLING, 
THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). 
43 See Gale supra note 39. 
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the costs of such coordination increase, and shifting the market to a new equilibrium 
may be prohibitively costly without a formal institution, such as a trade association, 
to facilitate.44 
A second branch of the lock-in literature focuses on internal dynamics 
within law firms as a source of contractual path dependency. Whereas the literature 
discussed above emphasizes the network effects that arise due to interdependence 
among participants in a market, this sub-strand of research emphasizes what might 
be considered the contractual “production process” within law firms. This work 
argues that how contracts are designed can matter for innovation as much as 
network effects. 
Research focusing on the production process tends to highlight how 
practices and routines lawyers use in contract design interfere with innovation. It 
begins with an observation that appears mundane at first glance: Transactional 
lawyers often use precedent documents and model agreements when designing their 
agreements. Those templates may be from prior deals that the law firm has done or 
may be publicly available agreements by other firms, which are now readily 
available on the SEC’s Edgar database of public filings and commercial databases. 
Deal lawyers may use portions of those precedent agreements wholesale—contract 
 
44 Empirical research has identified two primary coordination patterns. The first pattern—a gradual 
adjustment to a new equilibrium after an external shock—has been observed in multiple studies of 
the sovereign debt market, where a large number of bondholders participate in the market and 
coordination costs are therefore high. The external shock in these studies is typically a novel judicial 
interpretation of an old boilerplate provision, which demonstrates to market participants the need 
for a new, improved term. These studies find that, despite how obvious the need for a new term may 
be, the market is reluctant for months or even years to adopt a new formulation, with adoption only 
gaining steam once a coordinating event such as intervention by a major institution (e.g., a trade 
association) occurs. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in 
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L. J. 1, 38-40 (2017) (discussing the role of a set of meetings 
among major market participants, the first of which held at Columbia Law School, played in 
coordinating the shift to a new contractual standard); Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of 
Contract Evolution, 88 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1, 23 (2013) (discussing role of the 
International Monetary Fund in coordinating the shift to a new contractual standard); Stephen J. 
Choi et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 131, 162 (2012) (same); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate 
Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds Conference on Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring: The View from the Legal Academy, 53 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 929, 935-36 (2004) 
(discussing role of the IMF and other major institutions in coordinating a shift to a new contractual 
standard). 
That gradual model of contract innovation differs from the swifter—or “light switch”—
model of change observed when coordination costs are relatively low. For instance, a simultaneous 
shock on both the corporate bond market and the acquisition market for privately-held companies 
found that adoption of a new contract term began almost immediately in the privately-held company 
acquisition market, where participation is concentrated and coordination costs therefore low. At the 
same time, change in corporate bonds was much more gradual in comparison. Robert E. Scott et al., 
Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private and Public Company Transactions, 2020 WIS. L. 
REV. 629–656 (2020). 
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design by Copy and Paste.45 Or they may use precedent as a starting point, tweaking 
it in subsequent iterations.  
The reason for reusing boilerplate may express risk aversion. Particularly in 
bargains with high stakes, a lawyer may not wish to venture into uncharted territory 
by including a new contractual formulation that, while arguably superior to 
precedent, increases their personal exposure to blame if a problem between the 
contracting parties later arises.46 
The end result is, once again, that established terms can become frozen in 
time. Not only are contract terms in stasis, however. The meaning of the language 
can also degrade, as lawyers reuse it without reflection from one deal to the next. 
A contract term may appear in an agreement, but what it actually means has been 
lost to memory.47 Devoid of real intent, the term functionally becomes a 
“contractual black hole.”48 
 
B. “Too Hot”: Self-Interested Lawyers Overwork Contractual 
Language 
In stark contrast to the literature highlighting contractual stasis, the rote 
usage of contract terms may also invite the opposite dynamic. Indeed, some 
scholars have advanced the argument that contractual language is sometimes too 
quick to change, even when the reasons to do so are do not further the clients’ 
interest. Under this accounting, contractual innovation is “too hot.” 
One formulation of its reasoning focuses on product differentiation. 
Particularly in new and evolving fields and applications, transactional attorneys 
may be in a competition to “set the standard” for deals on the horizon. Under this 
approach, clients may be particularly attracted to those setting the standard, 
assuming them to have greater expertise and experience in an area. Anticipating 
this reaction, of course, law firms may be incentivized to change the contractual 
language simply for the sake of change, as a means of signaling their expertise to 
the market. In these scenarios, firms may introduce trivial alterations to well-
established terms in an attempt to differentiate their legal offerings. In the limit, 
such strategic tailoring may represent “churning” a contract by adding immaterial 
adjustments to justify time that will be billed to a client.49   
Product differentiation of this sort leads to a pattern of contract evolution 
different from the models emphasizing path dependence discussed above. 
Deliberately altering yesterday’s deals terms on the margins leads to an increase of 
diversity in the market. Anderson & Manns, for instance, depict developments in 
 
45 See Claire Hill, Repetition, Ritual and Reputation: How to Market Participants Deal With (Some 
Kinds of) Incomplete Information, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 101. 
46 Gulati & Scott, supra note 35. 
47 Stephen J. Choi et al., Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation?, 20 
AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 1–45 (2018); Gulati & Scott supra note 35. 
48 Stephen J. Choi et al., supra note 27. 
49 Anderson & Manns, supra note 28.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810214
  Draft 
 14 
contract terms as “phylogenetic trees” that reveal the incremental change of terms 
over time.50 
 
C. “Just Right”: Incremental Contractual Innovation Is Achieved 
The third, and perhaps most traditional, line of argument identifies 
circumstances where contract evolution proceeds at a pace that is “just right” on 
average, evolving to best fit the exigencies and needs at the time. Not only does this 
account comport with the neoclassical economics view of contracting,51 but it also 
aptly describes a long and pedigreed account of corporate law in general.52 In the 
context for M&A transactions, there appears to be some support for this theory as 
well. For example, Coates finds evidence that M&A agreements are neither fully 
customized to each deal nor completely boilerplate, exhibiting a type of 
“constrained variation.”53  
What drives certain contracts to fall within this intermediate category rather 
than one of the two extremes is not entirely obvious, although it can be 
hypothesized that the interests of the clients are incorporated by the transactional 
lawyers to at least some extent. A steady cadence of efficient contractual innovation 
may be achieved because clients screen for quality in their attorneys, and quality in 
turn requires a lawyer to internalize the clients’ interests. Similarly, law firms may 
develop internal organizational routines and incentives that effectively support 
client-driven innovation, rather than encouraging deal teams to rely too much on 
internal boilerplate templates.54 Alternatively, industry trade associations may be 
particularly effective in reducing the coordination costs that impede contractual 
innovation, as discussed above. Bernstein’s classic studies of industry associations 
in a variety of commodity industries regularly updating standardized form contracts 
provide one such example.55  
Under any of these accounts, one might expect contract terms to evolve in 
an efficient direction on average, in some cases arriving there very quickly. Such a 
dynamic is also most consistent with efficiency considerations, as it suggests that 
any evident lock-in might simply be an optimal gravitation to a provision that is 
categorically value enhancing. 
 
50 Id. 
51 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. OF L. AND ECON. 1 (1960). 
52 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, ch. 1 (1991). 
53 John Coates IV, M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice, in 
Research Handbook on Mergers and Acquisitions (Claire A. Hill and Stephen Davidoff Solomon 
eds. 2016); Matthew Jennejohn, Transformation Cost Engineering, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 573 
(providing empirical evidence that the standardization of different terms differs across different 
categories of M&A contracts). 
54 Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 73 
(2018). 
55 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through 
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724–1790 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, Confusion 
about Custom: Disentangling Informal Customs from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 UNIV. 
OF CHI. L. REV. 821–835 (1999).  
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C. The Limits of Prior Research 
While the research reviewed above significantly enriches our theory of how 
contracts are designed, it also raises several vexing questions. Conventional 
contract theory teaches us that the design of an agreement turns upon the unique 
bargaining dynamics between the parties that negotiate it, a setting that may itself 
change over time. Yet each the various accounts above suppress the mechanics of 
how, precisely, this dynamic process unfolds. Contract provisions may become 
resistant to change due to third-party expectations within a market, shortfalls of 
expertise among advisers, asymmetric flows of information in a market, lawyer’s 
dysfunctional drafting practices, or slack between lawyers and the clients who pay 
them to design their agreements. In each case, the emergence of boilerplate terms 
seems to emphasize the diametric opposite of contract economics’ message: 
Contracts are not expressly bargained for; rather, they are the result of a production 
process, with bargaining dynamics sitting offstage. 
Holding this issue aside, there remain important limitations that prior 
research has not yet overcome. First, although prior research gives us a punch list 
of possible factors that may inhibit contractual innovation, it provides little 
direction on how to combine them into a coherent theory that can explain how the 
factors interact or when one factor is more influential than others.  
Relatedly, many commercial agreements are complex, including dozens or 
even hundreds of terms, but scholarship tends to study terms in isolation.56 This 
obscures the possibility that factors contributing to path dependency affect 
agreements asymmetrically, with some terms standardized and others customized. 
This middle-ground category of agreements is found in important markets, such as 
the market for corporate control: M&A agreements are neither fully customized to 
each deal nor completely boilerplate, exhibiting rather “constrained variation.”57  
Finally, prior studies typically build conceptual models of contract 
innovation that are specific to certain markets, rather than constructing 
generalizable models that can be deployed across a variety of exchange 
environments. Gaining meaningful traction in this area going forward will require 
scholars to stitch together these stylized examples into a unified theory.58  
 
56 Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical 
Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. AND POLITICS 1 (2008); Cathy Hwang & Matthew 
Jennejohn, The New Research on Contractual Complexity, 14 Cap. Mkts. L. J. 381 (2019). Choi, 
Gulati & Posner provide an important exception to this trend. Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note [x]. 
57 John Coates IV, M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice, in 
Research Handbook on Mergers and Acquisitions (Claire A. Hill and Stephen Davidoff Solomon 
eds. 2016); Matthew Jennejohn, Transformation Cost Engineering, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 573 
(providing empirical evidence that the standardization of different terms differs across different 
categories of M&A contracts). 
58 There are some exceptions to this rule. One of us, for example, has analyzed how choice of forum 
provisions across hundreds of thousands of agreements can exhibit important cross-industry trends. 
See Nyarko, supra note 24 (analyzing choice of forum provisions in a sample of half a million 
agreements spanning a number of industries).  
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     This Article takes an important step toward addressing those gaps in the 
literature. It provides a general model of contract evolution that combines multiple 
constraints on innovation, can capture dynamics across a variety of agreement types 
and terms, and can be deployed across any number of markets. The next Part turns 
to this task in earnest, informally introducing the basic moving parts of our model. 
II. A General Model of Contractual Evolution 
 
In order to generate intuitions about when, why, and how contract terms 
change over time, this Section develops a formal model of contract term evolution. 
To frame our discussion, we will employ a canonical timely example pertaining to 
the adoption of a pandemic-related exclusion in an M&A deal, much like the 
Tiffany-LVMH dispute discussed above.  Nevertheless, as discussed in the 
Introduction, the framework we present below is quite general, and it advances a 
mechanism for contract term evolution that plausibly applies to any contractual 
scenario where legal actors play a pivotal role in contract design. 
Before proceeding, we pause briefly to address our methodological 
approach in this section, which uses a formal model to generate several intuitions. 
Our purpose in undertaking this approach is motivated in some measure by our 
observation above that the legal scholarship literature still lacks a unified theory of 
contract term evolution. Part of that lack of unity stems from the absence of a single 
framework within which to evaluate each account. And this is where formal models 
can provide great utility.  
To be sure, formal models frequently attract criticism because they are said 
to be unrealistic, given that they do not capture the complexity of real-world 
scenarios. While this criticism has some merit, it is important to understand that 
any model is--by definition--a deliberate abstraction and is therefore unrealistic by 
design. But that is also the point: a virtue of models is that they train focus on a 
limited set of core phenomena that are of interest, isolating them from other factors 
that are either unrelated or less pertinent to the inquiry at hand.59  Doing so often 
reveals intuitions that would be harder to discern and understand if not viewed in 
isolation. In turn, those intuitions can be assessed against real world data (which 
we proceed to do in Part III).  
That said, we do not aspire to develop a formal model that is prohibitively 
difficult to understand—for that would defeat the purpose of developing clean 
intuitions. Consequently, this part substantially presents our modeling approach 
and core results informally, using numerical examples where appropriate. Readers 
interested in a more technical characterization of the model that makes use of 
formal notation can find it in the Appendix. 
 
 
59 For more on this point, see Eric L. Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic 
Account of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L. J. 277, 310 (1998). 
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A. The Setting 
Consider a transactional setting that involves a sequence of buyer-seller 
pairs, each negotiating terms governing an acquisition agreement.  For 
concreteness, suppose that exactly one contract is negotiated each day, and neither 
the buyer nor the seller is a contract repeatedly. For each such transaction, the buyer 
and seller retain a sophisticated law firm to represent their interests, delegating to 
them the task of negotiating many of the transactional details outside of price. In 
contrast to their clients, these law firms are repeat players. To illustrate using the 
example of the Tiffany/LVMH merger, among the details negotiated by the law 
firms is a “Material Adverse Effect” (MAE) provision, which determines whether 
and under what circumstances the buyer can walk away from the deal in the face of 
changed circumstances. Below is a typical example of such an MAE clause (edited 
for clarity): 
 
“Company Material Adverse Effect” means any effect, change, event, 
circumstance or occurrence that has had or would reasonably be expected to have 
a material adverse effect on the seller’s business, operations, or financial 
condition; provided, however, that none of the following shall be taken into 
account in determining whether a Company Material Adverse Effect has 
occurred or may occur: (A) any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect 
resulting from or relating to changes in general economic or financial market 
conditions; (B) any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that affects the 
targets industry as a whole…. 
     
The excerpted passage is structured in a way such that the many—but not 
all—important risks associated with changed circumstances are assigned to the 
seller. In particular, the buyer is allowed to walk away from the deal when there is 
a significant negative impact on the seller’s business, operations, or financial 
condition. However, the provision also excludes certain types of changed 
circumstances that do not count as a material adverse effect; meaning that such risks 
are effectively born by the buyer. In our example, the buyer is not allowed to walk 
away from the deal if the effect also impairs the economy or other peer firms in the 
industry. These latter exclusions are popularly known as “MAE carve-outs.” 
To add some contextual color, suppose the first transaction in this sequence 
is negotiated in late 2019, just as news of the COVID-19 virus were beginning to 
spread.60 Cognizant of the nascent risk, counsel for the seller deliberate whether to 
propose a deviation from the standard MAE, inserting “pandemics” as an explicit 
MAE carve-out. From the seller counsel’s perspective, doing so would provide 
considerable benefits: it maximizes the probability that the deal closes, and it 
assigns all the risk of a pandemic to the buyer. At the same time, however, an 
explicit pandemic carve-out will come at a cost. First, it calls attention to the 
emergent hazard, which is significant if buyer’s counsel were not already aware of 
 
60 See, e.g., Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html?smid=url-share. 
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the risk. Second, counsel for the buyer would likely be unwilling to accept a 
pandemic carve-out without extracting a buyer-friendly provision as a quid pro 
quo.61 Third, enumerating a “pandemic” expressly as a MAE carve-out could have 
unintended consequences as to other unanticipated changes. If, say, some distinct 
disaster eventuates (e.g. an asteroid hitting the Earth), the fact that this MAE has 
chosen explicitly to carve out pandemics while remaining silent on everything else 
may lead courts to conclude that all other non-pandemic risks were intentionally 
excluded and should be treated differently.62 By including an explicit pandemic 
carve-out, then, seller’s counsel might unwittingly amplify the likelihood that a 
court will assign other, non-enumerated risks to the seller (e.g. “terrorism”). Given 
all of these uncertainties, the seller’s counsel may have difficulty determining with 
certainty the value of the pandemic carve-out. Counsel for the buyer may be in a 
similar position, unsure of the magnitude of the underlying risk, but possibly 
receptive to a pandemic exclusion if they could extract a sufficiently valuable 
concession in return. 
 
B. Sequence of the Model and Informational Environment 
Against this backdrop, our model envisions that a new contract term or 
“mutation” (e.g., a pandemic carve-out) might require several distinct transactions 
to emerge. And it is here that lawyers begin to play an important role. As noted 
above, in each transaction a new buyer-seller pair seeks to conclude an agreement, 
each retaining one law firm chosen at random from a fixed population of multiple 
firms.63 Once two firms are selected, they negotiate over whether to retain the 
traditional term or whether to adopt the new explicit carve-out provision. Their final 
decision is influenced by several considerations, including their general beliefs, the 
knowledge and experience they gained from prior deals, and their (possibly 
imprecise) impressions of the economics of the deal in front of them. We will detail 
each of them below. 
 
1. Composition of population 
Our model assumes that adopting the mutation is not ideal for all possible 
contracts.  In particular, we suppose that there is a percentage of deals—denoted by 
𝑧—for which a pandemic carve-out would represent a net cost, effectively 
 
61  Albert Choi & George G. Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 1665, 1671 (2012) (describing a two-stage negotiation process in which non-price terms are 
negotiated after the price terms are fixed); Jeffrey Manns & Robert IV Anderson, The Merger 
Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1776 (2012) (describing that non-price terms typically 
cannot be traded off against price terms). 
62 This interpretive canon, sometimes known as Ejusdem Generis, states that when there is an 
enumerated list of examples, such lists should be read to limit the reach of more general terms. See, 
e.g., State v. Russell, 187 So. 540, 543 (Miss. 1939); see, e.g., Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So. 2d 
384, 388 (Miss. 1954). 
63 In our baseline simulations, we will arbitrarily set the number of law firms to 10 for expositional 
purposes. Our model allows the number of law firms to be set at any positive, non-zero integer. 
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destroying value. Such scenarios could, for example, represent a transaction where 
the buyer is a superior risk bearer, or where uncertainty about judicial interpretation 
of the term is prohibitive. For the remaining percentage of deals, or (100% − 𝑧), 
the new mutation would create value. Such a situation might describe scenarios in 
which the seller is the superior risk bearer or the uncertainties about legal 
interpretation are low. Significantly, however, we further assume this key 
proportion z is itself not known with certainty but could take on one of two profiles. 
Either (a) the population tends to favor the conventional term, such that 𝑧 = 70% 
(and 1 − 𝑧	 = 	30%); or (b) it tends to favor the mutation, with 𝑧 = 30% (and 1 −
𝑧	 = 	70%). Regardless of which direction the populations skews, it is clear that the 
mutation does not yield a uniformly positive payoff across all deals.  
 
2. Baseline belief about composition of population 
Importantly, our model assumes that the population skew itself is not 
directly observable by the negotiating lawyers. In other words, lawyers do not know 
for certain whether the population of deals, on balance, benefits from the new 
mutation or not. Facing such uncertainty, the first (and most logical) starting point 
for them is their underlying “prior belief” about the population’s characteristics. 
Because our core interest is to trace the evolution of contractual provisions 
unfamiliar environments, we presume that attorneys begin with considerable 
confidence that the mutation is not valuable on average. Instead, they (incorrectly) 
believe that 70% of deals should not adopt the mutation and instead incorporate the 
conventional term. In our baseline analysis, we assume that attorneys are 95% 
confident of this fact, and that they assess only a 5% likelihood that the overall 
population of deals favors the mutation. Combining these facts, it follows that the 
parties’ prior belief that a randomly selected deal is amenable to the mutation is 
only 32%.64 
 
3. Signal of the deal 
In addition to general attributes of the population, we further assume that 
each new deal brings with it its own information that assists the parties in 
determining whether the mutation is likely to generate value. This point is trivially 
true in many ways. For instance, as noted above, the buyer and seller themselves 
may be able to assess to a certain degree which party is better able to bear risk, and 
the pricing formulas of each deal (e.g., cash versus stock) may further suggest who 
the most efficient risk bearer is.  The parties likely also have specific information 
about how susceptible their other operations are to events like pandemics that have 
widespread impacts on the economy. To the extent that they have access to and can 
accurately process such information, transactional lawyers would want to 
incorporate it in deciding whether or not to adopt the mutation. 
 
64 That is, 0.95*30% + 0.05*70% = 32%.  
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     That said, the lawyers are a step removed from both the internal 
operations of their clients and other factors that might affect the overall value of 
each. As a result, their deal-specific knowledge may itself be somewhat limited, 
and not always reliable. Our model accounts for this possibility too, by presuming 
that lawyers have access to a noisy “signal” of whether the specific deal before 
them is best adapted to the mutation. The accuracy of this signal will prove 
important to the lawyers’ subsequent actions.  
To take one extreme example, suppose lawyers are particularly perceptive 
and can identify with 100% accuracy whether a deal they are negotiating is best 
adapted to the conventional term or a new term. Here, we would not expect that 
other information pertaining to the population-wide distribution of deals had any 
consequence. The attorneys would craft the deal in a way that is best suited to the 
deal in front of them. On the other end of the spectrum, suppose the deal signal 
wholly uninformative, and was right and wrong with equal likelihood. Here, the 
signal would be useless, and the parties would lean exclusively on their beliefs 
about what is best for the average deal in the population of all contracts. 
The most realistic scenario, however, falls right between those two 
extremes, where the signal is neither perfect nor useless. The parties, therefore, can 
combine it with their preexisting beliefs about the entire population of deals in order 
inform their actions the deal in front of them.  As we show below, this possibility 
gives rise to an interesting learning dynamic where the lawyers may sometimes be 
guided by their knowledge about the population, and sometimes be guided by their 
deal-specific information, and this proclivity might change over time. 
 
4. Prior experience 
Finally, and perhaps most centrally, our model allows the transacting 
attorneys to engage in a form of dynamic learning through prior deal-making. 
Lawyers are, after all, the pivotal repeat players in this context, and they can be 
expected to gain additional information about the effects and appropriateness of the 
mutation as time passes. As lawyers negotiate more and more deals over time, they 
begin to amass their own collection of prior signals they observed in past 
transactions. That information, in turn, can buttress their knowledge and 
expectations as to whether, on average, it is more likely that the mutation increases 
or decreases their contractual surplus.   
In our illustrative example, the lawyers may over time observe that deals 
incorporating the mutation appear with surprising frequency. While they perhaps 
would have resisted the new term for the first few deals, the increasing frequency 
of seemingly well-adapted deals can cause them over time to update their beliefs 
about how many deals benefit from the new term.  
Given the incremental learning possibilities, our model also allows the 
amassed knowledge of both lawyers to inform their transaction collaboratively. 
Here, we assume that lawyers can draw on their past experiences--in particular 
signals they have observed from prior deals--to update their beliefs about how 
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prevalent mutation-favoring deals are in the population. Specifically, we suppose 
the lawyers negotiating each deal are able to pool their observations from prior 
deals to further refine their assessment of the overall population through Bayesian 
updating.65  This assessment is then combined with the signal they observe in the 
instant deal, and the parties will favor the mutation if and only if they believe the 
deal in front of them is at least 50% likely to warrant the mutation. 
C. Model Simulations  
Having laid out the basic elements of our model, we are now in a position 
to demonstrate some of the ways that it may propagate an assortment of diffusion 
patterns. We begin by briefly illustrating and discussing the role of several of our 
parameters on the diffusion pattern. We believe that this exercise yields intuitive, 
yet important insights into how mutations might diffuse in practice. In a second 
step, we will consider special cases of diffusion patterns. 
Table 1 describes the core elements of our model, both in plain English 
(column 2) and in terms of a mathematical parameters (column 3). When a 
parameter is involved, we also specify the value we assign to it in our baseline 
analysis (column 4). For instance, the first row in the below table suggests that we 
denote the number of law firms with the symbol 𝑁 and that we set it to 10. This 
means that, in our baseline model, the parties choose from a pool of 10 law firms. 
To develop intuitions about the diffusion paths, we use the parameter values 
from the Table to simulate a series of 2,000 sequential deals (or “rounds”), each of 
which follows the process described above.  Because each simulation sequence 
evolves probabilistically, it need not always follow the same path when simulated 
multiple times. We therefore rerun the 2,000-round simulations repeatedly in order 
to assess the average tendencies of the diffusion paths over time. In all the 






65 The term “Bayesian” refers to a well-known relationship in probability theory governing how a 
rational decision maker (“she”) marshals available information to update her probabilistic beliefs 
about the world. The process of updating follows what is known as “Bayes’ rule,” which states (for 
the case of discrete random variables) that the probability of an event A occurring, conditional on 
knowing that some other event B has occurred (or Pr[A|B]) can be derived from a combination of 
the respective “base rate” probabilities of A and B (or Pr[A] and Pr[B]) and the “reverse 
conditional” probability that B occurs, conditional on knowing that A has occurred (or Pr[B|A]). 
These four probabilities are related to one another according to the following expression: 
 Pr[𝐴|𝐵] = !"	[%|']×!"	[']
!"	[%]
.   
See, e.g., Eric L. Talley, Law, Economics, and the Burden(s) of Proof, Research Handbook on the 
Economics of Torts, Jennifer Arlen, Ed., Edward Elgar (2013) (applying Bayes rule in legal 
contexts). 
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Step Description Parameter Benchmark 
Value 
1 A one-shot buyer and a one-shot 
seller choose their counsel from 
a pool of repeat-play law firms 
Number of Law 
firms = 𝑁 
10 
2 The lawyers negotiate over the 
adoption of either a conventional 
term or a mutation. A fraction of 
all deals favors the conventional 
term, and the remainder favor 
the mutation 
Fraction of deals 
favoring the 
conventional 
term = 𝑧; 
Proportion 
favoring the 
mutation = 1 − 𝑧 
0.3 (or 30%) 
4 Lawyers share prior beliefs that 
the population is on balance best 
adapted to the mutation 
Prior beliefs = 𝑟! 0.05 (or 5%) 
5 Lawyers assess whether specific 
deal in front of them is best 
adapted to mutation or 
conventional term 
Accuracy of the 
inference by the 
lawyers = 𝛾 
0.6 (or 60%) 
Table 1. Key Parameters for Term Evolution Simulations (Benchmark Case) 
 
1. The Benchmark Case 
 As described above, our benchmark model fixes the various parameter 
values at 𝑧 = 0.3, 𝑟! = 0.05, 𝛾 = 0.6. This set of baseline parameters is tantamount 
to assuming that the adoption of the mutation is value enhancing in 70% of deals, 
but that law firms have a strong prior belief of the opposite, and that the mutation 
is on-balance value decreasing.  
As can be seen in Figure 1, lawyers are initially hesitant to adopt the 
mutation term. But over time, they incrementally build prior experience and begin 
to adopt the mutation, although the rate of adoption is gradual. As time progresses, 
the adoption rate converges to 100%, and the mutation displaces the conventional 
term to become dominant. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810214
  Draft 
 23 
 
Figure 1. Benchmark Simulations 
 
It is worth noting from this benchmark simulation that the mutation is not 
simply successful in diffusing the market, but it is too successful in some ways. 
Although the majority of deals (70%) are well adapted to the mutation, it visits a 
loss for 30% of them.  In this sense, the collective embrace of the mutation 
“overshoots” the first-best rate of 70% adoptions. The reason for this overshooting 
is simple: In our baseline simulations, lawyers do not have particularly good skills 
of discerning deal-specific information – the signal they observe is only 60% 
accurate, meaning that lawyers have only modest confidence in their ability to 
diagnose the specific deal in front of them. In an environment of such contract-
specific uncertainty, they eventually lean more on their population-wide 
knowledge, embracing an imperfect “one-size-fits-all” approach: Since prior 
experience suggests that the mutation has been, on average, value-enhancing in the 
past, law firms ultimately opt to adopt it in every one of their deals. 
 
 2. The Strength of the Prior Belief (𝑟!) 
 
Another key factor in the diffusion path is what belief the lawyers hold 
initially. In our benchmark case, we assume that they start out believing strongly 
(but incorrectly) that the mutation is, on average, value-decreasing. It is only over 
time that they amend those beliefs. In Figure 2, we consider two alternatives. In 
the first, we fix 𝑟! = 40%, so that the lawyers only have a weak belief that the 
mutation is value-decreasing. In the second, we fix 𝑟! = 95%, corresponding to a 
strong belief that the adoption is value-increasing. 
Clearly, prior beliefs strongly influence the diffusion pattern. If prior beliefs 
are weak (𝑟! = 40%, per the left panel), lawyers will be less inclined to stick with 
the conventional term and are more quickly to adopt the new mutation, relative to 
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the benchmark case. Although this point might seem intuitive, we believe it is still 
an important finding. After all, out in the real world, law firms can vary 
dramatically in expertise. Law firms that are relatively less comfortable in assessing 
a legal field likely have weaker priors and would thus be more likely to embrace a 
new mutation. In contrast, specialized experts (e.g., boutique firms) may have hold 
particularly strong priors. Our model suggests that these strong priors can also come 
with a decreased willingness to adopt contractual innovations. 
 
Figure 2. Alternative Prior Beliefs 
When lawyers’ prior beliefs more closely correspond to the “ground truth” 
that the mutation is value enhancing on average (𝑟! = 95%,  per the right panel), 
the convergence is nearly automatic: they will initially adopt the term immediately 
and generally continue on that path. 
 
 3. The Number of Law Firms (𝑁) 
Another key factor in understanding diffusion paths concerns the size of the 
law firm market. In our benchmark simulations, we assumed that there are 𝑁 = 10 
law firms that the parties randomly choose from. We vary this assumption in Figure 
3, where we consider the alternative cases of a “small” market (𝑁 = 3, left panel) 




Figure 3. Altering the Number of Law Firms 
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As is clear from the Figure, smaller markets lead to faster adoption, while 
large markets dampen diffusion. The reason is very much tied to the key attribute 
of learning in our diffusion model: prior experience. Varying the number of law 
firms implicitly adjusts the frequency with which each individual law firm is able 
to gain experience. In the left panel (𝑁 = 3), for instance, each law firm will, on 
average, negotiate one of every three deals. This allows the lawyers to quickly 
accumulate experience with the specific type of deal in front of them. Because 
experience plays a significant role in the learning process, accumulating more 
experience allows the firms to more quickly learn that the mutation is value-
enhancing. In contrast, with (𝑁 = 100), each law firm will, on average, negotiate 
only one in one hundred deals, making it difficult to accumulate significant 
experience. 
We believe that this insight has important implications in practice. It 
suggests that, in highly concentrated industries where legal services are provided 
by a handful of firms, adoption of a mutation can occur at much greater pace than 
if the provision of legal services is highly dispersed. A corollary to this proposition 
is that large law firms attracting a lot of business can obtain a competitive advantage 
in their drafting practices. Indeed, it has often been asked whether large law firms 
provide any distinct economic value to their clients that cannot be obtained equally 
by other, smaller players. A study by Elizabeth de Fonteney points out that one 
advantage of hiring such firms could be their accumulated expertise and precision 
in pricing deals.66 Our findings formalize and add to those of de Fonteney. In 
particular, we show formally that, through repeat interaction, large firms may be 
better positioned to identify promising mutations in contractual language and 
differentiate between those that increase the surplus for the clients and those that 
decrease the surplus. We highlight, however, that this effect could be somewhat 
counteracted by if large firms hold particularly strong and incorrect beliefs about 
the value proposition of a mutation. 
 4. The Accuracy of the Signal (𝛾) 
Another determinant of diffusion paths concerns expertise of the lawyer, 
proxied by the precision of attorneys’ signals about the deal in front of them. Our 
baseline model assumed that the signal received from each deal, while more 
accurate than not, is relatively noisy (𝛾 = 60%). In Figure 4, we examine several 
alternatives. First (upper left panel), we adjust this precision upwards to 𝛾 = 65%, 
which assumes that the signal is slightly more accurate than the benchmark. We 
then set 𝛾 = 95%, which assumes that the signal is highly accurate (upper right 
panel). In a last step, we consider the special case of 𝛾 = 50%, which suggests that 
the signal is essentially random noise and nothing can be learned from the signals 
observed in current or prior deals (lower panel). 
 
66 Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 41 J. OF 
CORPORATION L. 393-430 (2015). 
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Note that a slight increase in signal precision (upper left) enhances the pace 
at which the mutation is adopted. We believe this to be intuitive. As the signal 
becomes more accurate, parties can learn about the population more quickly. That 
said, the pattern when signal precision his very high (upper right panel) looks 
markedly different. Rather than converging to an adoption rate of 1, the adoption 
rate is close to the first-best efficient adoption rate of 70%. To understand this 
result, recall that a high signal precision means that the lawyers have very good 
information about the deal in front of them. 67 Here, the signal from the deal is 
accurate enough to make obsolete any population-wide information the parties 
have, no matter how accurate.  When, in contrast, the signal’s precision stays below 
the overall population proportions (such as 65%), the signal is not as diagnostic as 
good information about the overall population ratio (here 70%). Consequently, the 
latter information eventually controls the adoption decision. 
 
 
Finally, for completely uninformative signals (bottom panel), no learning is 
possible. Here, the mean adoption rate is a flat line at 0, indicating that law firms 
do not even experiment with adopting the mutation. This makes intuitive sense, 
since here the signal is random noise. With nothing to learn from current or prior 
 
67 The mean adoption rate is not exactly at the efficient level of 0.7, but slightly below it. This is 
because lawyers still have a strong prior that the mutation is value decreasing. 
Figure 4. Altering the Signal's Precision 
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signals, lawyers in each round tether their decisions to their prior beliefs about the 
population.  
	
5. Special Cases 
In addition to changing around the parameters of our benchmark 
simulations, we also analyze diffusion patterns under the assumption that there are 
several “shocks” to the transactional environment and ask how the adoptions 
patterns change after the shock. Although several such shocks are conceivable, we 
concentrate on two of them below: Regime Shocks, and Information Shocks.	
	
Regime Shocks  
A “regime shock” refers to a scenario in which the population-wide net 
costs and benefits from the mutation suddenly shift. In the case of our example, 
such a shock may take the form of a sudden arrival of vaccines or herd immunity, 
which alter value proposition for including a pandemic exclusion in the contract.68 
Alternatively, a regime shock might constitute the enactment of a new law or 
judicial decision that establishes a new precedent in how a mutation is interpreted 
by the courts.69 
Figure 5 depicts two different types of regime shocks. In the first (left 
panel), we introduce a shock in round 1000 that changes the proportion of deals 
favoring the conventional term 𝑧 from 30% to 70%. We assume that parties slowly 
update their beliefs, which is a finding consistent with observations in the literature 
on how contractual parties sometimes react to a change in precedent.70 In the second 
scenario, we consider the opposite regime shift, where the proportion of deals 
favoring the convention changes from 70% to 30%. Here, we assume that the 
 
68 Another particularly visible example (and one we study empirically below) pertains to so-called 
Weinstein or #MeToo representations in M&A deals. Through these provisions, sellers guarantee 
that, to their knowledge, key employees are not involved in any litigation or investigation alleging 
sexual misconduct or abuse. While traditionally, it was assumed that #MeToo representations are 
largely unimportant, the sexual abuse scandal surrounding Harvey Weinstein drastically increased 
the negative consequences for a company to be subject to such litigation. As such, the number of 
deals for which a #MeToo representation could be overall value enhancing increased dramatically 
and suddenly. 
69 For instance, whereas parties under the “doing business” test traditionally enjoyed relatively great 
flexibility in choosing their preferred litigation forum, a series of Supreme Court decisions starting 
in 2011 introduced the “essentially at home test” under which a company could only be sued in their 
principal place of business or their state of incorporation. Arguably, this shock increased the value 
of choice-of-forum provisions, in turn altering the underlying proportion of contracts for which the 
adoption of a choice-of-forum provision is value enhancing.  
70 In our model, we assume that parties slowly update their beliefs, rather than observing the change 
and immediately correcting course. This is consistent with other findings in the literature, which 
have found that drafting practices can often be sticky. Nyarko, Stickiness, supra note 24 
(“Suggesting that the use of templates may slow down the pace of adaption”); Kahan & Klausner, 
supra note 37 (“Arguing that network effects may induce some amount of stickiness.”); Gulati & 
Scott, supra note 35 (“Finding that, in the context of the pari passu clause, lawyers were slow to 
adapt drafting practices to a novel judicial interpretation of the provision.”) 
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regime change is immediately observable, an assumption consistent with regime 
changes induced by many highly publicized events. 
 
 
From both simulations, it is clear that parties begin to adjust their behavior 
when the shock occurs. In the left panel, what had been a growing trend towards 
adoption suddenly changes course, and parties increasingly reject the mutation as 
they observe increasing transactions poorly adapted to it. In the right panel, the 
lawyers initially stick with the conventional term while it is dominant, but then 
quickly adopt the mutation when a mutation-favoring shock occurs. As mentioned 
above, there is an initial and immediate increase in the adoption rate because we 
assume that the lawyers directly observe the change in the population, whereas in 
the simulation to the left, they learn about the full extent of the shift over time. 
These simulations demonstrate the importance of the underlying 
environment that generates each deal. As that environment changes, we see gradual 
adaptation to the new regime by parties through learning. That said, in both of the 
above scenarios, the eventual diffusion pattern that takes hold has the effect of 
overshooting the true population composition. Attorneys thus use their deal-
specific information to adjust their overall expectations, but over time tend to set it 
aside with individual contracts, emulating the emergent norm. 
 
Information Shocks 
A second type of shock concerns not the underlying contracting 
environment but rather a shock to information. In the benchmark case, we assumed 
that deal experience generates substantially private information for law firms. In 
other words, the knowledge that each firm acquired in prior transactions was not 
generally disclosed publicly, but at most was shared with the contractual partner in 
their current deal. This is often a reasonable assumption since both rules of 
professional conduct and private reputation building incentives would tend to 
induce lawyers to keep client-specific information close to their chests.71 
 
71 See American Bar Association, Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6. 
Figure 5. Regime Shocks 
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That said, in certain contexts, private information is pooled effectively for 
public consumption. For instance, in the M&A industry, the American Bar 
Association conducts “Deal Points Studies” at regular intervals. For these studies, 
the ABA collects information from merger agreements that parties have previously 
disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission. It then shares this 
information, including current trends in the adoption of certain contractual 
provisions, with the industry at large. Other examples include academic studies that 
examine contractual practices. The release of information collected in these studies 
can be considered “information shocks” during which the private deal making 
practices of the law firms become public knowledge.  
We can incorporate information shocks and demonstrate their effects on 
diffusion patterns within our model. Figure 6 does this in the following way: In 
round 200, we assume that all law firms receive credible information about the 
adoption pattern in all prior rounds. They then run “internal simulations” to assess 
what diffusion path would have looked like if 𝑧 = 30% and what it would look like 
if 𝑧 = 70%. Next, they compare the diffusion path of their internal simulation to 
the observed diffusion path. They then update their beliefs based on the relative 
likelihood that the observed path would have emerged in each scenario. After 
making this determination, the lawyers update their baseline prior belief 











In the left panel of the Figure, the information that is released to the public 
about contract practices is accurate. To illustrate, this scenario emulates the release 
of a deal points study that indicates whether or not other drafters believe their deals 
to benefit from the mutation. It also makes public who has chosen to adopt the 
mutation so far. As can be seen, the intervention suddenly and significantly 
increases the adoption rate in comparison. This is because lawyers more quickly 
learn that many of them received the signal that the adoption of the mutation is 
value enhancing. They thus more quickly realize that, on average, it is beneficial to 
adopt the mutation.  
In contrast, in Figure 6 (right panel), we assume that the information shock 
releases incorrect information. One can imagine several reasons for why this may 
Figure 6. Information Dumps 
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happen. For instance, most events that seek to update lawyers on contract drafting 
practices are inherently limited in the sample they can draw from. For instance, the 
most comprehensive contracts database is the SEC EDGAR database. In it, 
interested parties can find “material contracts” concluded by publicly registered 
companies. However, many types of transactions are not represented in that 
database. For instance, deals between private companies or those involving smaller 
stakes cannot are absent. Those who seek to pool information, such as the ABA, 
additionally limit their sample, e.g., by only including M&A transactions that 
exceed 100 million dollars. If skewed samples incorrectly represent the entire 
population of deals, there is the danger that parties draw incorrect inferences from 
the pooling intervention. 
 As shown in Figure 6 (right panel), such incorrect pooling of 
information generally delays the adoption of a mutation. However, absent 
extraordinary circumstances,72 parties will eventually accumulate sufficient 
representative signals in their own practice to overcome the incorrect inference they 
drew from the pooling event. This is significant, because it suggests, although 
incorrect information causes some harm to the adoption practice, drafters’ 
experience ultimately prevails. 
                                         
III. Applying the Model: Examples of Term Diffusion in the 
M&A Market 
 
One of the useful attributes of simulating the outcome of diffusion patterns 
under our model is that it allows us to form intuitions about how to interpret patterns 
of diffusion that we see in the real world. How well does the above analysis capture 
these practices? In this section, we turn to applying the model to real world data of 
contractual evolution in the M&A market. Specifically, we focus on a collection of 
2,141 M&A for deals in excess of 100 million dollars signed between 2000 and 
2020. We ask whether their diffusion pathways appear to resemble those identified 
in our model and simulations. In doing so, we again note that it should not be 
expected that any real word diffusion pattern maps exactly into the patterns 
observed during our simulations. As we highlight above, our model is an 
abstraction, leading to much cleaner observations than can be found in real world, 
complex data sets. As such, the evidence presented in this section should be 
considered suggestive, rather than determinative.  
When assessed against the backdrop of our model, real-world practices 
display trends that enable us to determine possible contributors of diffusion and 
diagnose the normative desirability of the observed trends. Perhaps most 
importantly, we find that the merger agreement provisions we study do not all 
follow a single evolutionary trajectory from any one of our simulations. Rather, our 
analysis finds that some practices appear to follow one pattern, while others follow 
 
72 If r0 takes the extreme value of 0 or 1. 
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a different one. Our conclusion from this comparison is that the contractual 
evolution in the M&A market is far from homogenous.73  
Merger agreements are rich in dimensionality, typically containing a great 
number of provisions spanning dozens (if not hundreds) of pages.74 We focus here 
on a discrete subset of notable terms: (1) pandemic-related force majeure 
provisions, (2) #MeToo (or “Weinstein”) provisions, (3) CFIUS provisions, (4) 
reverse termination fees, (5) top-up options, and (6) choice of law and forum 
provisions. For the M&A specialist, these terms will be quite familiar. Just as 
important, this list includes terms that have been described by other observes as 
exemplars of diffusion, mutation and evolution over the last few decades.  
In the subsections below we consider whether and how the reception of each 
term matches up with our modeling predictions.  Each of the following subsections, 
then, first provides a brief description of each term we study, and then illustrates 
the actual dynamic diffusion pattern of each such term over the last two decades.   
To formulate these actual diffusion patterns, we draw on a substantial, hand-
collected database of 2,141 definitive merger agreements spanning nearly two 
decades,75 which we have hand labeled for the existence of several provisions. 
 
1. MAEs/Pandemic Carve-Outs 
The Material Adverse Effect or Material Adverse Change (“MAE” or 
“MAC”) provision is a staple of any M&A transaction, used to allocate risk and 
provide grounds for terminating a deal in the event certain unforeseen 
circumstances occur.76 The basic MAE provision defines the MAE (somewhat 
 
73 See Matthew Jennejohn, Transformation Cost Engineering, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 573–594 (2020) 
(finding evidence of diversity in a collection of terms in M&A agreements from one large corporate 
law firm). 
74 JOHN C. COATES, WHY HAVE M&A CONTRACTS GROWN? EVIDENCE FROM TWENTY YEARS OF 
DEALS (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2862019 (last visited Dec 19, 2016). 
75 We hand-collected all M&A contracts for deals valued above $100 million and publicly available 
on the Security and Exchange Commission’s website from 2003 through the first half of 2020. 
76 Due to its importance, the modern material adverse effect provision has become the subject of a 
number of conceptual and empirical studies in recent years. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Alan 
Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 THE JOURNAL OF LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 330–358 (2005); Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: 
Allocating Risk through Mac Clauses in Business Combination, 50 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW 
REVIEW 2007–2104 (2008–2009); Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual 
Conditions, 34 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 755–812 (2009); Robert T. Miller, 
Canceling the Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change Clauses in Business Combination 
Agreements, 31 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 99–204 (2009–2010); Andrew A. Schwartz, A Standard 
Clause Analysis of the Frustration Doctrine and the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA 
LAW REVIEW 789–840 (2009–2010); Eric Talley et al., The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-
Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements [with comment], 168 
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (JITE) / ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE 
STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 181–208 (2012); David J. Denis & Antonio J. Macias, Material Adverse 
Change Clauses and Acquisition Dynamics, 48 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 819–847 (2013); Antonio J. Macias & Thomas Moeller, Target signaling with material 
adverse change clauses in merger agreements, 39 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE 69–92 (2016). 
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circularly) as “any event, circumstance, development, or condition occurring that 
has already had, or would be reasonably expected to have, a [MAE] on the target.”77 
This language is then typically followed up with a list of carve-outs or exceptions 
that—notwithstanding the foregoing language—would not constitute an MAE—
i.e., these enumerated events do not constitute sufficient grounds for termination. 
Carveouts can be quite general (e.g., including general macroeconomic or 
governmental events), or specific (e.g., natural disasters, climate change, and other 
industry-specific risks).78 Finally, the MAE might also provide exceptions to the 
exceptions (sometimes called “carve ins”), stating that any of the MAE exceptions 
could still constitute an MAE if, for instance, it has a disproportionate impact on 
the seller as compared to other companies in the seller’s industry.79  
Generally, the term “material” in a MAE provision is not defined,80 so 
guidance on what actually constitutes an MAE sufficient to justify termination of a 
deal comes almost entirely from the courts. In 2001, the IBP shareholders’ 
litigation81 provided the now-standard interpretation of MAE clauses, reading the 
provision as incredibly seller-friendly and making three important findings: first, 
that “a general economic or industry decline […] could not alone constitute a MAC 
[…] [thus] the purchaser must show that the event had the ‘required materiality of 
effect’ on the target.’”82 Second, the court found that “contractual language […] 
must be interpreted in light of the ‘negotiating realities’ and larger context in which 
the parties were contracting,”83 further noting the difference between financial and 
strategic buyers in a MAE context.84 Third, the court noted that “the decision 
ultimately boiled down to a question of public policy, […] [and that] would likely 
require the purchaser to make a strong showing before allowing it to invoke a MAC 
exception to its obligation to close.”85 Indeed, the Court of Chancery in In re IBP 
 
A term that once attracted primarily U.S.-focused commentary is now taking on international 
dimensions. See, e.g., NARINE LALAFARYAN, THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF MATERIAL ADVERSE 
CHANGE IN ENGLISH LAW: COSTING A FORTUNE IF NOT CORPORATE LIVES (2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3626266 (last visited Feb 27, 2021). 
77 Andrew L. Burnstine & Perry F. Sofferman, COVID-19’s Impact on the M&A Market: Measures 
and Precautions, BOARD OF CONTRIBUTORS – MIAMI DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW 2 (July 10, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2020/07/10/covid-19s-impact-on-the-ma-market-
measures-and-precautions/.  
78 Bryan Monson, Note, The Modern MAC: Allocating Deal Risk in the Post-IBP v. Tyson World, 
88 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 774 (Mar. 2015). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 773. 
81 In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
82 Id. at 779 (quoting IBP, 789 A.2d at 71). 
83 Id., at 779 (quoting IBP, 789 A.2d at 67). 
84 When litigation concerns a financial buyer, it’s more likely that a short-term issue could be a 
MAC, whereas a strategic buyer looking to acquire the company for reasons not purely financial 
would be less likely to succeed in classifying a short-term dip in earnings potential as an MAE. Vice 
Chancellor Strine opined on the difference between financial and strategic buyers in IBP, stating: 
“it is odd to think that a strategic buyer would view a short-term blip in earnings as material, so long 
as the target's earnings-generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or the blip's cause.” 
IBP, 789 A.2d at 67.  
85 Monson, supra, at 779.  
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declined to find that a MAE had occurred.86 In that respect, the case was a 
harbinger: Buyers’ attempts to argue that a material adverse effect had occurred in 
subsequent cases would regularly founder on the shoals of In re IBP’s rigorous 
standard.87 It was not until 2018 that the Delaware Chancery Court sided with a 
regretful buyer’s claim that a MAE had indeed occurred, permitting the buyer to 
terminate the deal on those grounds.88 
 While the basic structure of MAE provisions has remained 
essentially standardized since the 1970s,89 certain events have the potential to 
impact MAE provisions significantly and permanently. For example, early MAE 
provisions excluded any mention of weather-related risks; now, terrorism and 
natural disasters are included in almost every MAE’s list of carve-outs.90 The 
COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to be one such permanent change to the 
MAE formula, though recall that the LVMH-Tiffany deal did not specifically 
invoke pandemics as a carve-out even though it specifically mentioned other 
explicit types of hazard. 
Figure 7 illustrates the dynamic adoption of pandemic-specific carveouts 
in MAE provisions. To qualify, we require that the carveout explicitly include 
reference to a pandemic, disease, public health crisis, or something functionally 
similar.  Such carve-outs were virtually nonexistent prior to the 2009 H1N1 
outbreak, though a small number of provisions attended the earlier SARS and 
MERS outbreaks outside of the US. With H1N1, however, the genuine possibility 
of pandemic related risks appeared to become more salient, and accordingly, carve-
outs began to appear in an increasing number of deals. Towards the end of 2019 
and particularly throughout 2020, pandemic-specific carveouts became more 
popular, appearing in over a third of announced deals. All indications suggest that 
the popularity of such carveouts will continue to accelerate during 2021. 
 
86 In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 16 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
87 See, e.g., Newmont Mining Corp. v. AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2020); Channel 
Medsystems v. Boston Scientific, 2019 WL 6896462 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18. 2019); Hexion v. Huntsman, 
965 A.2d 715 (2008); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
88 Akorn, Inc. v Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 
2018).  
89 Monson, supra, at 773. 
90 Id., at 774. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810214
  Draft 
 34 
 
Figure 7. Pandemic Carve-Outs Over Time 
The largely monotonic and increasingly steep rise of pandemic related 
carve-outs is suggestive of our benchmark case, in which parties begin with a low 
assessment of pandemic relevance, and then reassess the underlying nature of the 
population of deals, increasingly incorporating pandemic carveouts into their 
successive transactions.  Note, however, that the change does not appear to have 
been discontinuous, such as one might see if (for example) a regime shock suddenly 
enabled attorneys to “read” the situation better. This pattern, therefore, seems to 
have many of the markings of a learning process – where succeeding generations 
of deals create momentum for subsequent adoptions. It is perhaps still too early to 
diagnose whether the diffusion pattern will ultimately “overshoot” the fraction of 
deals that might warrant a pandemic carve-out, and thus only time will tell where 
the current trend ultimately recedes before an adoption becomes ubiquitous. 
  
2. CFIUS Regulatory Covenants  
A second branch of potential diffusion patterns concerns regulatory 
covenants in M&A deals. These terms typically address the broad range of 
contingencies that can be vitally important to the deal’s closing. The most familiar 
example is found in many large strategic acquisitions, which allocate risks 
associated with obtaining antitrust approval from the FTC or the DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division.91 Companies operating in certain industries, such as banking or electrical 
 
91 The review of mergers for potential anticompetitive effects is undertaken by both the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in a dual regulatory 
system. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual 
Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-
Five Year Retrospective, 61 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL 167–198 (2008–2009). 
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utilities, also require approval from the relevant regulatory agencies.92 In most 
cases, the buyer will bear the regulatory risk and be bound by an efforts standard, 
typically “best efforts,” “reasonable best efforts,” or “commercially reasonable 
efforts” to address a regulator’s anxieties about the transaction.93 Standard “efforts” 
language appears in most deals related to regulatory risks and requirements, usually 
stopping short of the most extreme so-called “hell or highwater” standard,94 which 
places all of the non-closing risk on the buyer to do what is necessary to make the 
deal close—i.e., agreeing to whatever remedial measures the agency demands.  
Cross-border transactional lawyers have recently begun to pay particularly 
close attention to international regulatory approvals related to foreign direct 
investment. The Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS),95 
tasked with reviewing transactions “which could result in foreign control of any 
person engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S.,”96 has become relevant enough 
that “U.S. companies considering any level of foreign investment must have CFIUS 
on their radar.”97 CFIUS has the power to order itself or recommend to the President 
one of three courses of action: block, clear, or require mitigation measures to be 
imposed on the transaction. These options translate to opposing buy- and sell-side 
language: sellers, seeking closing assurances, want to avoid buyers opting to walk 
away from a deal rather than comply with CFIUS’s mitigation measures98 while 
 
92 See Jeremy C. Kress, Modernizing Bank Merger Review, 37 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 
435–498 (2020); Milton A. Marquis, DOJ, FTC and FERC Electric Power Merger Enforcement: 
Are There too Many Cooks in the Merger Review Kitchen, 33 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO LAW 
JOURNAL 783–790 (2001–2002) 
93 Matthew Jennejohn, Innovation and the Institutional Design of Merger Control, 41 JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATION LAW 167–216 (2015–2016)(situating parties’ efforts obligations within a broader 
effort to allocate uncertainty between the merging parties). 
94 “Hell or highwater” language was used in less than 5% of deals surveyed as it essentially corners 
the buyer into closing the deal no matter the cost. For a discussion of effort standard language, see 
Fang Xue, Yuefan Wang & Qi Yue, Recent Trends and Issues in Outbound Acquisitions by Chinese 
Companies, 20 THE M&A LAWYER 10, 3 (Nov./Dec. 2016),  
95 CFIUS was brought into existence by the Exon-Florio Amendment of 1988 to Section 721 of the 
Defense Production Act of 1950. It was “significantly strengthened by the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) [which] established a statutory basis for CFIUS.” Margaret 
Gatti, Stephen Paul Mahinka, & Carl Valenstein, CFIUS: The Increasing Importance of National 
Security Reviews in M&A Transactions, MORGAN LEWIS 4 (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/events/~/media/9d0d926af4cb442ab132176fc5a3e81c.ashx. The 
codified language pertaining to CFIUS can be found at 50 U.S.C. 4565. 
96 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a). 
97 MP McQueen, CFIUS Report Shows Big Jump in Investigations, 262 N.Y.L.J. 106, Sec. Expert 
Analysis 3 (Dec. 2, 2019) (hereinafter CFIUS Report Shows Big Jump in Investigations). McQueen 
reports that from 2014 through 2017, the number of investigations rose 237%. The growth appears 
to be more concentrated on the back end: the percentage of transactions subjected to mitigation steps 
was less than 10% per year between 2008 and 2015 but reached almost 20% in 2017. Additionally, 
the percentage of transactions subjected to the agency’s 45-day investigation process (rather than 
being cleared or blocked after the 30-day review period) rose from 46% in 2015 to 70% in 2017, 
with both numbers “far above the percentages in most prior years.” CFIUS Taking a Larger Role in 
Inbound M&A, BAIRD (2018), http://www.rwbaird.com/news/CFIUS-Taking-a-Larger-Role-in-
Inbound-MA.  
98 Sellers often negotiate for “best efforts,” “reasonable best efforts,” or “commercially reasonable 
efforts” language related to the buyer’s obligations seeking approval, often adding language stating 
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buyers, looking to preserve the option to walk away for precisely that reason, seek 
language eliminating liability in the event CFIUS approval cannot be obtained.99  
A complicated combination of factors influences parties’ use of regulatory 
risk allocation language in their merger agreements. On one hand, the intensity of 
regulatory review has been increasing. In 2018 President Trump signed Executive 
Order 11858, creating the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 
2018 (“FIRRMA”) and significantly expanding CFIUS’s jurisdiction. 
 Additionally, CFIUS provisions may change based on the growing 
categories of deals subjected to CFIUS review, particularly as the agency’s reach 
has been significantly expanded. For example, the share of transactions in financial 
services companies which were subjected to CFIUS review rose from 26% to 46% 
between 2014 and 2017.100 The new FIRRMA regulations finalized in January 2020 
promise to further change the population of CFIUS-reviewed companies by 
widening the agency’s net to capture a much larger portion of the technology, 
insurance,101 and real estate sectors. Of note currently is the possibility that “the 
[COVID-19] pandemic may prompt CFIUS to examine health care sector 
transactions more closely than before,”102 expanding CFIUS’s real-world 
application in addition to its jurisdiction.103   
On the other hand, the increased intensity of CFIUS review is not felt 
uniformly across the market. Chinese investors have been hit particularly hard, for 
instance: In 2016, “Chinese buyers complete[d] just 67% of announced outbound 
deals” due to regulatory concerns.104 In a further interesting twist, Chinese investors 
 
that the buyer “not […] withhold unreasonably any consent to any mitigation or other requirements 
imposed by CFIUS in connection with the CFIUS [filing].” Gatti, Mahinka & Valenstein, supra, at 
37. 
99 Buy-side negotiators seek language confirming that “the [buyer] shall not be required to agree to 
any mitigation or other requirements as a condition of approval.” Id. 
100 See CFIUS Report Shows Big Jump in Investigations, supra.  
101 For a discussion of the impact of the new CFIUS amendments on the insurance sector, see 
Nicholas Klein, Gabriel Gershowitz & Prakash (PK) Paran, Insurance Sector Transactions to Face 
Increased Scrutiny, 264 N.Y.L.J. 99, Sec. Outside Counsel 4, col. 4 (Nov. 20, 2020). 
102 Anna Zhang, China Outbound Investment Decline Continues, Inbound Rises Amid COVID and 
Regulatory Challenges, LEGAL WEEK – LAW.COM 2 (June 22, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/international-edition/2020/06/22/china-outbound-investment-decline-
continues-inbound-rises-amid-covid-and-regulatory-challenges/.  
103 As one observer recently wrote:  
 
There is more monitoring of the investment universe than ever, so a decision not to file is a riskier 
decision than it used to be. [These days] […] it’s certainly wiser to seek [CFIUS] clearance on a 
preclose basis than to close and then hide and hope that the government won’t come looking for you 
later. 
Vincent Chow, Chinese Investment in US Plummets Under Increased Scrutiny, LEGAL WEEK – 
LAW.COM 2 (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2020/08/20/chinese-
investment-in-us-plummets-under-increased-scrutiny/ (quoting Jeremy Zucker, co-chair of the 
International Trade and Government Regulation Practice at Dechert, LLP in Washington D.C.). It 
is worth noting, though, that the recent change in presidential administration may signal a slight 
relinquishing of CFIUS power—yet another future uncertainty that may require explicit contractual 
allocation. 
104 Id. at 1, col. 2. 
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have been offering a “China premium” instead of agreeing to seller-friendly 
regulatory covenants in order to compensate for the heightened regulatory risk, 
meaning the investor increases their purchase price offer to compensate for the 
potential regulatory hurdles.105 Many sellers prefer such a premium to contractual 
risk allocation given that many Chinese buyers are outside the jurisdiction of 
necessary enforcement mechanisms and are unwilling to subject themselves to 
extrajudicial enforcement options.106 
Finally, after the 2014 Ralls case, where the proponents of an affected deal 
won a partial victory based on due process grounds, there may be countervailing 
willingness of foreign buyers to take risks if the review process is more transparent 
and transacting parties are able to more accurately assess the risk of regulatory 
prohibition.107 
 
Figure 8. CFIUS Provisions Over Time 
 
Figure 8 charts the empirical frequency of CFIUS-related provisions in the 
deals that we track. Although the Figure displays a very modest upwards trajectory, 
it does not appear to manifest the strong and nearly monotonic pattern of the 
 
105 Given how little control either party has and thus the near non-existence of leverage in terms of 
responsibility for regulatory approval, Chinese buyers rarely use RTFs to alleviate CFIUS risk 
concerns; rather, they’re most often used “in a competitive auction setting or in connection with 
submitting a topping bid.” Id.  
106 Id.  
107 See Ralls Corp. v Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the current 
CFIUS review process, which does not require CFIUS or the President to disclose the information 
which forms the basis of an order, violated Ralls’s due process rights and, further, requiring CFIUS 
and the President to disclose all non-confidential information used in making their recommendations 
and decisions during the review process to Ralls). 
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pandemic carve-outs above. Here, there appears to be significant variation year to 
year, with relatively modest serial correlation over time.  This pattern diverges from 
our benchmark case, and instead has more of the markings of a setting where the 
deal-specific signal is relatively precise and informative relative to population wide 
averages. This in many ways makes sense, since some of the historical markers of 
CFIUS scrutiny, such as cross-border deals, critical infrastructure or national-
security-related industries, are relatively easy to anticipate from observed deal 
attributes. In this case, then, the inclusion of CFIUS provisions tends to best 
resemble a “just right” type of diffusion, where the contract is well tailored to the 
situational environment. 
  
3. Reverse Termination Fees 
Reverse Termination Fees, or “RTFs,” (also known as “reverse break-up 
fees”) are fees that the buyer in a transaction may be obligated to pay if the deal 
fails to close. These provisions were first introduced in the 1980s but became more 
prevalent during the Dotcom bubble, when private equity (PE) buyers began 
negotiating RTF provisions into deals to protect themselves in the event they were 
unable to obtain adequate financing.108 Sellers generally accepted RTFs for two 
reasons: first, during times of economic uncertainty, sellers felt that RTFs further 
incentivized buyers to obtain adequate financing while simultaneously offering 
sure compensation if a buyer failed and, second, RTFs provided extra security for 
sellers that felt that the threat to a purchasing company’s reputation in the event 
they failed to obtain the necessary financing to close a transaction was simply 
insufficient collateral.109 
The increased use of RTFs followed a spike in “going private” transactions 
between 2005 and 2007, with language in even strategic transactions mirroring that 
of PE deals.110 By 2006, 25%111 of all transactions—both strategic and 
 
108 Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk through Reverse Termination Fees, 
63 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1161–1240 (2010) 
109 Afra Afsharipour, Paying to Break Up: The Metamorphosis of Reverse Termination Fees, U.C. 
LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 191 (Sept. 2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443613. 
Until around 2007, financial buyers often walked away from negotiations with a financing out 
collateralized essentially by their reputation, while strategic buyers were much more likely to face 
litigation and ultimately damages liability, which Vice Chancellor Strine noted was an “interesting 
asymmetry,” as well as noting that “the factors driving it seem to include both economically rational 
ones and ones that are less rational.” In re Topps S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 73 n.11 (Del. Ch. 
2007). 
110 Id., at 49; see also DHRUV AGGARWAL, THE AGENCY COSTS OF SELLSIDE DEAL PROTECTION: 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF REVERSE TERMINATION FEES (2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3559938 (last visited Feb 27, 2021); I. V. COATES ET AL., REVERSE 
TERMINATION FEES IN M&A (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3016785 (last visited Feb 27, 
2021); Brian J. M. Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE LAW 789–828 (2010).   
111 2007 Transaction Termination Fee Study, HOULIHAN LOKEY (Sept. 2008) 
https://hl.com/uploadedFiles/11_Blogs/Fairness_and_Solvency_Opinions/HL-Termination-Fee-
Study-2007.pdf.  
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financial112—included RTFs; in 2007 that number had risen to nearly 35%.113 When 
the financial crisis hit in 2008, strategic buyers began to face more stringent lending 
and credit standards and were treated more like financial buyers by banks and 
lenders,114 which encouraged strategic buyers to begin negotiating RTFs into their 
deals as well. By the 2008-mid 2009 period, 26.1% of strategic transactions 
included RTFs, up from 16.1% in the 2003-04 period.115 
The RTF structure transformed as the provisions became more 
commonplace. Originally, RTFs were essentially just the flip side of the traditional 
seller termination fee coin, but by 2008 three distinct styles of RTFs had emerged. 
First, the two-tier approach provided for the payment of two RTFs conditioned on 
different sets of triggers, and occasionally permitted the seller to seek specific 
performance.116 Second, the hybrid approach limited a buyer’s liability to payment 
of the RTF in the event circumstances beyond their control ultimately resulted in 
the termination of a deal but allowed a seller to seek specific performance in the 
event the buyer was responsible for circumstances leading to a transaction’s 
termination.117 Third, the option-style approach essentially provided a worst-case 
scenario for buyers, giving them “broad walk-away rights with their exposure to 
damages limited to the RTF.”118   
Between 2003 and mid 2009, the percentage of strategic deals which 
included RTFs utilizing the option-style structure rose from 8.8% to 26.3%119. 
During the 2008 financial crisis, a record number of buyers walked away from 
deals, many taking advantage of the option-style RTFs “which either permitted the 
 
112 “Strategic transactions generally involve operating synergies between the businesses of the buyer 
and the seller or the aggregation of greater market power in a particular product line, for example 
the combination of two pharmaceutical companies. […] Financial buyers […] seek to acquire 
companies that they can grow and/or improve [with an] ultimate goal of […] selling the cleaned up 
company to another buyer within a few years for a substantial gain, or alternatively, to take the 
company public.” Afsharipour, supra, at 10-11.  
113 2007 Transaction Termination Fee Study, supra note 111.  
114 Afsharipour, supra note 108, at 55-56. 
115 The percentage of only strategic transaction contracts which included RTFs rose from 16.9% in 
the 2003-04 period to 26.1% in the 2008-mid 2009 period. Id., at 73. 
116 The Merck-Schering transaction mandated an RTF of $2.5 billion if the transaction failed to close 
due to a financing failure. If the transaction failed to close due to a lack of shareholders’ approval 
or Merck engaged in a competing third-party transaction, Merck owed only a $1.25 billion RTF. 
Id., at 52-53. 
117 In Pfizer’s $68 billion purchase of Wyeth, the $4.5 billion RTF was triggered only in the event 
Pfizer could not obtain financing for reasons specified in the merger agreement; if Pfizer 
experienced a financing failure for any other reason, Wyeth could either seek specific performance 
or terminate the deal and collect the RTF from Pfizer. At the termination date, Pfizer would then 
have the option to close the deal with alternate financing or terminate the deal and pay Wyeth the 
RTF. Id., at 49-51.  
118 Id., at 54. Additionally, in United Rentals, the court ultimately found that the buyer’s perception 
of the RTF as essentially an option or walk-away right was reasonable, thus if the buyer walked 
away, the seller’s recourse was limited to the RTF, even if such termination was predicated by the 
buyer’s own breach. United Rentals, Inc. v. Ram Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
119 Of those 26.3% of deals including an RTF, 33.8% had RTFs coupled with provisions making the 
RTF the sole and exclusive remedy, precluding the seller from seeking specific performance. 
Afsharipour, supra note 108, at 47. 
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buyer to walk away for any reason or gave the buyer broad latitude to arrange 
triggering of the payment of [a] fee”120 often representing less than 10% of a deal’s 
transaction value121. 
Many scholars believed that the record breakdown of deals represented the 
end of the RTF but, by the 2015-17 period, 86% of large-market transactions and 
50% of middle-market transactions were memorialized by agreements containing 
RTFs.122 However, the content of recent RTFs appears to differ from that of their 
predecessors. More RTFs provide for limited specific performance rights,123 
employing a two-tier or hybrid structure, or are limited to instances where the buyer 
is unable to obtain adequate financing or regulatory (specifically antitrust) 
approval.124 Additionally, RTFs—especially those limited to financial or regulatory 
failures—are often coupled with a “[reasonable] best efforts” standard, which has 
been key in protecting sellers in litigation following the breakdown of a deal125. 
 
 
120 Id., at 48. 
121 Id., at 22. See also Richard A. Presutti et al., Private Equity Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal 
Study: 2015-17 Review and Comparative Analysis, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL (Sept. 17, 2018). 
122 Down from 92% and 83%, respectively, in 2013-14. Id., at 15. 
123 Between 2015-17, 81% of large-market transactions and 45% of middle-market transactions 
offered the seller limited specific performance rights. While 83% providing the seller limited 
specific performance rights in the 2013-14 period, 83% of middle-market deals had provided limited 
specific performance rights for the seller in the 2013-14 period. Put another way, 17% of large-
market transactions offered the seller limited specific performance rights, increasing to 19% in the 
2015-17 period. In contrast, 55% of transactions in the 2015-17 period offer the seller full specific 
performance rights, up from only 17% in 2013-14. See Houlihan Lokey, supra. 
124 Between 2005-2019, 12.1% of deals had RTFs with antitrust-specific triggers. Dale Collins, 
Antitrust Reverse Termination Fees—2019 Q3 Update, SHEARMAN & STERLING: ANTITRUST 
UNPACKED (Dec. 10, 2019), available at https://www.antitrustunpacked.com/?itemid=72.  
125 In Hexion Chemicals, the Delaware Chancery Court sought to determine whether the buyer had 
materially breached its representations and warranties and/or its covenants by trying to use the RTF 
as an option without first seeking alternate financing. Vice Chancellor Lamb held that “to the extent 
that an act was both commercially reasonable and advisable to enhance the likelihood of 
consummation of the financing, the onus was on [the buyer] to take that act. To the extent that [the 
buyer] deliberately chose not to act, but instead pursued another path designed to avoid 
consummation of the financing, [the buyer] knowingly and intentionally breached this covenant.” 
Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A2d 715, 749 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
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Figure 9. Reverse Termination Fees Over Time 
Figure 9 illustrates the frequency of reverse termination fees over time. 
Much like CFIUS provisions, RTFs appear to have very weak discernible patterns. 
One interpretation is that, like with CFIUS, these terms generally “get it right” from 
deal to deal. That said, since around 2016, RTFs have become substantially less 
popular in the deals we track.  To the extent this drop-off continues, it may well be 
more suggestive of RTFs suddenly falling out of favor—either because of a 
dramatic regime shift, or simple unfashionability. This pattern is one of the more 
difficult ones to identify with our canonical patterns simulated above. 
 
4. “MeToo” Reps 
Around the beginning of 2018, as the #MeToo movement became a 
household conversation topic, it also became clear that the risks associated with 
sexual harassment allegations against a company’s executives were not just 
reputational, but also economic, as companies began to realize that “sexual 
harassment allegations and lawsuits […] could actually sink a deal and have 
significant ramifications”.126 In response to the “major financial risk” 127 of 
undisclosed or post-closing sexual harassment scandals, lawyers began adding 
“Weinstein” or “#MeToo” provisions to transaction agreements, disclaiming a 
party’s knowledge of allegations of sexual harassment within or against employees 
of the company within a specified timeframe. The first of these clauses appeared in 
 
126 Chelsea Naso, #MeToo Movement Molds New Protections in Mergers, Law360.com 1 (Jan. 18, 
2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1119874 (current as of Apr. 12, 2019). 
127 Id. 
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a March 2018 deal between SJW Group and Connecticut Water Services128 and, 
within a year, 39 publicly disclosed deals contained so-called “Weinstein 
clauses”.129  The clause can appear in a variety of incarnations, including a 
representation, an MAE provision, or even a closing condition, though the most 
common–and most effective–use is “a representation and warranty by the target 
[…] that since a specific date no allegations of sexual harassment or misconduct 
have been made against the company’s officers or executives”130. Breaches of this 
representation offer the buyer recourse, though the extent of the remedy varies 
depending on whether the deal is private or public.131 
Most #MeToo reps follow a now familiar protocol pattern132–which 
includes a specified lookback period or time span, limitations regarding relevant 
employees, related disclosure schedules, and a knowledge standard133–each of 
which can limit or expand the scope of the following general idea: “Since x date 
there have been no sexual harassment allegations against the company’s 
executives”134. The lookback period or time span is most commonly three to five 
years135. The representations generally only cover allegations against high-level 
employees and are often limited in application to allegations against anyone at the 
rank of Senior Vice President or above.136 Disclosure schedules are used less 
frequently but can be a useful qualification tool, as they remain confidential. 
However, some practitioners note that “prefatory reference to a disclosure schedule 
might […] suggest that [a company] has significant sexual-harassment 
liabilities,”137 so target companies are wary of such a method of incorporating 
allegations.138 The knowledge standard is perhaps the most variable term: target 
 
128 Jaclyn Jaeger, The ‘Weinstein Clause’: M&A deals in the #MeToo era, COMPLIANCE WEEK 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.complianceweek.com/the-weinstein-clause-manda-deals-in-the-
metoo-era/2113.article.  
129 Anna Windemuth, Article, The #MeToo Movement Migrates to M&A Boilerplate, 129 Yale L.J. 
488 (Nov. 2019).  
130 Grace Maral Burnett, ANALYSIS: #MeToo Reps Becoming M&A Market Standard, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Jun. 25, 2019, 11:18 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-
analysis/analysis-metoo-reps-becoming-m-a-market-standard.  
131 Claw backs allowing the buyer to recoup some of its investment or purchase price appears more 
in private company acquisitions, though the clauses have “more discursive potential in the public-
deal context” given the reputational impact including or excluding such a provision might have on 
a company’s reputation regardless of the underlying allegations. Windemuth, supra note 129, at 
498. 
132 Id., at 503. 
133 These standards tend to vary in accordance with typical negotiation-related factors like the 
leverage of the respective companies, but it is worth noting that in the context of Weinstein reps 
there is more pressure in certain industries, with “[t]he provision disproportionately appear[ing] in 
deals involving ‘strong, founder-led businesses’ such as ‘technology and media and entertainment 
companies.’” Id. at 516 (quoting a telephone interview with a subject). 
134 Burnett, supra note 130, at 2. 
135 Additionally, some representations include two time periods: one (usually shorter) regarding 
allegations required to be reported, and one (usually longer) for complaints. Market Trends 2019: 
#MeToo Representations, PRACTICAL GUIDANCE – LEXIS (current as of Apr. 18, 2020). 
136 Id. 
137 Windemuth, supra note 129, at 508. 
138 Id. 
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companies seek to limit their liability by requiring actual knowledge, or limiting 
the knowledge requirement to “personnel who would ‘reasonably be expected to 
have actual knowledge’ of [such] matter[s],”139 while buyers often prefer a 
constructive knowledge requirement.140 Essentially, the Weinstein clause ends up 
operating as a guideline with respect to the level of due diligence an acquirer must 
conduct to accurately assess the risk affiliated with a target company. 
There are two general points worth noting about the underlying idea behind 
#MeToo reps and their variations: first, the inclusion of these representations 
highlight the level of risk associated with sexual harassment as opposed to other 
types of litigation a company may face. Second, the reps require a target to affirm 
its knowledge of allegations of sexual harassment or misconduct, lowering the 
threshold for disclosure to one below any legally anointed claim.141 These two 
unique aspects of #MeToo reps emphasize both how hyper-aware buyers currently 
are of the “potentially devastating financial and social consequences of […] sexual 
misconduct […]”142 as well as the “relationship between corporate dealings and 
social norms.”143 While some have expressed concerns related to due process issues 
stemming from disclosure of unproven allegations, or the possibility that #MeToo 
reps encourage a target company to discourage reporting to increase the likelihood 
of an acquisition. However, given the depth of due diligence companies conduct 
into a potential target, it is equally likely that companies, especially startups, might 
actually reevaluate the mechanisms by which they handle such misconduct.144 It 
remains to be seen whether or not the Weinstein clauses have taken their final form, 
but the legal world has generally accepted that the provisions are here to stay.  
Figure 10 illustrates the adoption of #MeToo representations over time.  
Note the facial similarity to pandemic carveouts of the significant uptick in 
adoption, also consistent with our benchmark case. For Weinstein reps, however, 
the sudden increase is even more explosive, with a dramatic spike in 2018 alone. 
Such seemingly discontinuous shifts, then, also seem consistent with our regime 
shift simulations (See Figure 5 above), where the underlying economics of the 
 
139 Id. at 507 (citing Agreement and Plan of Merger Among Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc., 
Illumina, Inc. and FC OPS Corp., art. 1, § 1.01 (Nov. 1, 2018)). 
140 Constructive knowledge widens the scope by including in the representations allegations which 
the target company might have uncovered with reasonable investigation. A buyer’s preference 
would obviously be to have no knowledge requirement – and therefore unlimited liability on the 
seller’s behalf – but of all publicly filed M&A contracts (as of June 17, 2019), only seven deals (or 
16%) did not include a knowledge qualifier, implying “it would take a strong buyer to keep it out.” 
Burnett, supra, at 5-6. For a discussion of actual versus constructive knowledge requirements in the 
context of Weinstein reps, see Javon Johnson, Comment, An Epidemic of Workplace Sexual 
Misconduct: The Birth of the Weinstein Clause in Merger and Acquisition Agreements, 52 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 377, 400 (2020). 
141 See id. Additionally of note is the fact that all 39 deals published within the first year of the 
Weinstein clause’s introduction left the word “allegation” undefined. See Windemuth, supra note 
129, at 512. 
142 Mergers & Acquisitions Alert: #MeToo Movement Gives Rise to Use of “Weinstein Clause” in 
M&A Transactions, ARCHER (Aug. 2018), https://www.archerlaw.com/mergers-acquisitions-alert-
metoo-movement-gives-rise-to-use-of-weinstein-clause-in-ma-transactions/.  
143 Johnson, supra note 140, at 407. 
144 Windemuth, supra note 129.  
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inclusion of the provision suddenly shift. This seems consistent with the arrival of 
the #MeToo movement at around the same time, with an increasing call for 
companies to renew their vigilance (or embrace it for the first time) in redressing 
longstanding allegations of sexual harassment and abuse among their most senior 
executives.   
 
Figure 10. #MeToo Reps Over Time 
As with pandemic carveouts, it is difficult to know whether the diffusion 
pattern of #MeToo provisions will continue to rocket upwards or will re-equilibrate 
to an underlying “new normal.” Either possibility presents itself here, as well as 
others. For example, the dramatic shift in awareness of sexual harassment issues 
may cause firms to become far more perceptive in diagnosing where and when such 
problems exist, and the new normal in this case might well converge only to a subset 
of companies where the signals look particularly worrisome.   
 
 5. Top-up Options 
Top-up options refer to special stock options that can be granted by the 
board of a target company to a bidder who has launched a tender offer for the 
target.145 Exercising the options allows the bidder to purchase newly issued shares 
 
145 Steven M. Davidoff, The Return of the Tender Offer, M&A LAW PROF BLOG (Jul. 10, 2007), 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/07/the-return-of-t.html; Mark A. Morton & John 
F. Grossbauer, Top-Up Options and Short Form Mergers (April 2002), 
https://www.potteranderson.com/media/publication/171_MAM_20JFG_20Top-
Up_20Options_20and_20Short_20Form_20Mergers_20_ 20Apr_202002_20Deal_20Points0.pdf; 
ERIK DEVOS ET AL., TOP-UP OPTIONS AND TENDER OFFERS (2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2448058 (last visited Feb 4, 2021); JOHN C. COATES, M&A 
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in order to reach the 90% ownership threshold necessary to effectuate a short form 
merger. Historically, this threshold was critical for many bidders, because once they 
crossed it, they could make use of a special Delaware statute (DGCL § 253) to 
execute a “short-form, back-end” merger, forcing all remaining hold-out 
shareholders to relinquish their shares. Typically, in order to exercise the options, 
the bidder must have been sufficiently successful in their tender offer to get within 
“spitting distance” of 90%, usually measured as above some specified point in the 
80–85% ownership range of the target. For several years, top-up options were an 
effective way for bidders unable to reach the 90% threshold with their initial tender 
offer to avoid the potentially lengthy process of a long form merger where the target 
corporation was required to hold a stockholder meeting to approve the deal. 
Top-up options first began to appear in 1999, and started to gain particular 
traction after 2006, when a new rule enacted by the SEC reduced some of the 
litigation risk associated with their use. By 2008, the inclusion of top-up options 
had become standard—e.g., 100% of negotiated tender offers from that year 
included one.  
In recent years, however, top-up options have lost some of their luster due 
to a statutory reform that made them less necessary. In 2013, the Delaware 
legislature amended Section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(introducing § 251(h)), a reform that became effective on August 1, 2013.146 
Section 251(h) introduced a somewhat more forgiving approach for two-step 
mergers that would allow an acquirer to freeze out the hold-out shareholders even 
when they comprised up to 49.9% of the shareholder base. Because of this relaxed 
threshold, the need for top-ups to get to 90% ownership was substantially mooted.  
Figure 11 illustrates the empirical frequency of top-up options over the span 
of our data.  The pattern here is striking: although top-ups were on a precipitous 
rise starting in around 2005, after 2013 they collapsed, and now top-ups barely 
register a pulse in annual frequencies.  The up-and-down pattern of this chart looks 
most like the regime shock simulations in Figure 5 above. 
 
CONTRACTS: PURPOSES, TYPES, REGULATION, AND PATTERNS OF PRACTICE (2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2593866 (last visited Dec 17, 2016). 
146 Daniel I. Fisher, DCGL Section 251(h): Top-Up Option No Longer Needed, AG DEAL DIARY 
(Sep. 3, 2013), https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/practices/corporate/ag-deal-diary/dcgl-
section-251-h-top-up-option-no-longer-needed.html; James Matarese & Danielle Lauzon, Death of 
the Top-Up Option in Two-Step Transactions, The CLS Blue Sky Blog (Oct. 17, 2013), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/10/17/death-of-the-top-up-option-in-two-step-
transactions/ 
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Figure 11. Top Up Options Over Time 
Viewed against the statutory context described above, the regime-shock 
label is an apt one. The promulgation of DGCL § 251(h) in 2013 substantially 
sucked the wind from the sails of top-up options, since it dramatically lowered the 
threshold with which to pull off a two-step merger. Moreover, with a lower 
threshold (usually 50%) in such deals, the continued use of a top-up to make it over 
the finish line would be particularly perilous, since many such transactions will 
likely invoke heightened fiduciary duties under the Revlon doctrine, and a top-up 
would seem especially suspect.  
6. Choice of Law/Forum Provisions 
The final provision we study is the inclusion of a term selecting the forum      
that will govern any disputes arising from the contract, typically referred to as a 
choice-of-forum provision. A choice-of-forum provision establishes personal 
jurisdiction of a court in case a dispute arises between the parties. In effect, it is a 
contractual device to reduce uncertainty in contractual relationships with parties 
that have connections to several jurisdictions.147 Many modern commercial 
transactions fall into this category, given that the state of incorporation, the place 
in which contract negotiations occur, the location of performance etc. can all fall 
apart and can be grounds for a court to find personal jurisdiction. In the context of 
M&A, choice-of-forum provisions are of particular interest, because they can 
 
147 For a detailed account of the choices parties have to address the uncertainty, see David A. 
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 425–29 (analyzing the extent to 
which parties make use of their contractual liberty to customize procedure, including the forum). 
For a broader discussion of choice-of-forum provisions and how they are interpreted in practice, see 
John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1803–19 (2019) 
(discussing the scope of interpretation for forum selection clauses). 
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reflect two competing interests of the parties. On one hand, most corporations are 
incorporated in Delaware and its courts have garnered significant expertise in 
presiding over corporate law disputes.148 At the same time, New York has long been 
the favored jurisdiction for business law disputes, including most commercial 
contract disputes.149 The preference is at least partially the result of a concentrated 
effort of New York courts to adhere to a strict, textualist interpretation of 
contractual language. Indeed, New York is famous for sticking to the “four corners” 
of the writings as it interprets the contract, thus providing the certainty and 
predictability often sought by commercial parties.150 
It has traditionally been relatively easy for parties to access courts in New 
York. In assessing personal jurisdiction, courts used to apply the “doing business” 
test under which it was sufficient that a company does business “with a fair measure 
of permanence and continuity” in New York to establish the courts’ jurisdiction.151 
Since most companies trying to access New York courts did some amount of 
business there, a choice-of-forum provision may have been obsolete. However, in 
2011, the Supreme Court started narrowing the test to the “essentially at home” test, 
which limits general jurisdiction over a company to its place of incorporation and 
its principal place of business.152 And although these disputes were not contract 
disputes, courts in New York quickly embraced the narrower test to reject 
jurisdiction in contracts cases.153 Most importantly for our purposes, since it has 
become more difficult to access New York courts without a choice-of-forum 
provision, the change in precedent can be understood as a “regime shock” of the 
type we discuss above. 
Figure 12 depicts the incidence of choice-of-forum provisions that establish 
the jurisdiction of New York courts. As can be seen, relatively few contracts started 
 
148 Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 92, 98 (2012) (studying the attraction of Delaware for corporate litigation and 
finding that it is highly valued by attorneys in this particular context). 
149 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of 
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 (2009) (finding that New York is the most prominent forum for 
commercial disputes). See also Nyarko, Stickiness p. 39 (confirming these findings using a larger 
sample of commercial agreements). 
150 “[The four corners] rule imparts stability to commercial transactions by safeguarding against 
fraudulent claims, perjury, death of witnesses * * * infirmity of memory * * *[and] the fear that the 
jury will improperly evaluate the extrinsic evidence. (Fisch, New York Evidence § 42, at 22 [2d 
ed].) Such considerations are all the more compelling in the context of real property transactions, 
where commercial certainty is a paramount concern.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (W.W.W. 
Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 566N.E.2d 639, 642 (1990)); 
151 See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (N.Y. 1917). 
152 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). See also Daimler AG 
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
153 See, e.g., Blustein v. Akam, 61 N.Y.S.3d 190, 190 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (denying jurisdiction in a 
breach of contract case with references to Daimler and Goodyear); Trodale Holdings LLC v. Bristol 
Healthcare Invs., L.P., No. 16 Civ. 4254 (KPF), 2017 WL 5905574, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 
2017) (applying the “essentially at home” test to deny jurisdiction over companies incorporated in 
Georgia and Tennessee); Letom Mgmt. Inc. v. Centaur Gaming, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 3793 (PAE), 
2017 WL 4877426, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017) (denying general jurisdiction over a defendant 
incorporated in Indiana under the “essentially at home” test). 
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out including a choice-of-forum provision. However, in 2010, at the advent of the 
change in precedent,154 the inclusion rate suddenly and dramatically increased, 
from about 13% to over 50% in subsequent years. Such a dramatic increase is 
consistent with our “regime shock” example (Figure 5), providing preliminary 
evidence that drafters in the M&A context observed and quickly adjusted to their 
changed environment.155  
 
Figure 12. Choice of Forum Over Time 
 
IV. Implications 
In the foregoing sections, we have developed, analyzed and applied to real-
world data a holistic framework for contract term evolution.  We have shown that 
patterns of diffusion not only can manifest in several distinct ways, but in practice 
they appear to do so with some regularity. While certain diffusion patterns appear 
to bear the markers of cascading sorts of behavior (diffusing quickly and 
categorically), others suggest a more bespoke tailoring of terms to fit the context. 
This section considers the broader implications of our analysis. We highlight three 
such implications here: (a) adjudicating between the competing accounts of 
 
154 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2010. 
155 We note that one of us has previously conducted a study of commercial contracts more generally 
to assess whether there was a change in the proclivity to include choice-of-forum provisions for any 
jurisdiction following a change in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Such an effect was not observable 
in this broader context. See Nyarko, supra note 24, at 59-64 
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contractual evolution outlined in Part I; (b) developing a theory of bargaining in 
transactions where prices are fixed early on and non-price terms follow; (c) 
extending our framework to take on non-rational-actor decision making reasoning. 
The first, and perhaps the most important, implication of our analysis 
concerns what it reveals about the stylized accounts of contract evolution discussed 
in Part I. While each of the Goldilocksian accounts highlighted has some intuitive 
appeal, they are difficult to reconcile with one another into a complete, 
parsimonious, and general picture of term evolution. And our analysis above 
exposes several of these limitations. For example, the “just right” account makes a 
strong prediction that terms should hew closely to economic efficiency 
considerations underlying a deal. All else constant, a novel term should be adopted 
if and only if it creates value for the parties who adopt it. A direct corollary to this 
point is that when the economics of different transactions are highly heterogeneous 
(a reasonable assumption in most cases), efficient terms should echo that 
heterogeneity, as negotiators fashion bespoke terms that best fit their idiosyncratic 
circumstances. Our analysis, however, demonstrates that such heterogeneity is far 
from inevitable, even for the most motivated and rational negotiators.  Particularly 
in settings where attorneys have limited information or expertise, they will not be 
able to identify with certainty the most efficient term on a deal-by-deal basis. 
Moreover, as our benchmark simulations show, attorneys may even begin rationally 
to ignore deal-specific information they are able to ascertain, particularly if they 
come to believe that population characteristics heavily favor one type of term over 
another. In such settings, drafting practices can start resembling a “contractual 
cascade,” with attorneys gravitating towards a monolithic term. This untailored 
term might yield beneficial results on average, but it remains a blunt instrument of 
contractual design. 
At the same time, neither the “too cold” nor the “too hot” accounts of 
contract evolution provide a complete picture either. Consider the former, which 
posits that terms will stubbornly (and inefficiently) resist change. Such outcomes 
could also result in our framework, which does not assume any special form of risk-
aversion or profound lack of sophistication. Yet within our framework, the rise of 
an inefficient “black hole” would generally require several special pre-conditions. 
Most immediately, it necessitates that attorneys begin with an incorrect prior belief 
that the conventional term is optimal overall. Second, the negotiators must have 
limited information and expertise – so that their (incorrect) beliefs about the overall 
population will prove difficult to overcome. And finally, other limitations must be 
so severe as to prevent transacting attorneys from effectively learning over a 
reasonable period of time, either because they lack an understanding of their 
transaction, or because the number of firms is so large that repeat play and 
concomitant “learning by doing” is not possible. When rapid or even moderate 
learning is possible over time, the system might still gravitate to a single modal 
term, but that term will be resilient over time only if it gets it right most of the time. 
Black holes could certainly emerge in some special cases of our framework, but the 
predicate conditions seem hardly general. 
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A second implication of our analysis is that it may help us to investigate 
deeper quandaries about how complex transactions are negotiated by lawyers. As 
is well known, large corporate transactions and financings often follow a pattern 
that an economist would find odd (if not backwards): Essential terms—and 
particularly the price—are usually set first, and only afterward are the remaining 
terms subject to negotiation. This pattern is unusual in many ways, since the price 
is a key mechanism for distributing the gains provided by non-price terms. If, for 
example, it is more efficient for a deal to have a pandemic carve-out, its inclusion 
will likely impose greater risks and costs on the buyer, who is now constrained in 
its capacity to walk away from the deal. One way to convince the buyer to accept 
the efficient carve-out is to give the buyer a downward price concession, allowing 
it to monetize some fraction of the gains created. When the price is fixed first, such 
fluid monetary “settling up” is no longer possible. 
Our model for term evolution may contain the seeds for resolving this 
paradox, in that it reveals how and when a similar type of efficient settling up could 
still operate, but through informal “bartering” among non-price terms. In other 
words, efficient bargaining when the price is already fixed can still occur, so long 
as there exists a non-price term that operates somewhat like a price. For example, 
suppose deals increasingly came to warrant pandemic carve-outs in force majeure 
provisions, and that this trend was driven by considerations for value creation. By 
definition, the adoption of the carve-out increases the joint surplus for the parties, 
but alone it could make the buyer worse off by imposing additional risk on them. 
A sophisticated buyer might still agree to this term if the seller is willing to adjust 
one of the more fluid, price-like provisions of the deal, such as the size of the 
buyer’s reverse termination fee.  Viewed in this context, then, we might find 
evidence of efficient bargaining in non-price terms if RTF triggers shrink 
(benefitting buyers) at the same times as pandemic exclusions proliferate (imposing 
costs on the buyer).156 
Finally, our framework represents a good starting point for developing 
deeper accounts of term evolution that combine learning dynamics with other 
“bounded rationality” theories of contracting. Behavioral economics and finance, 
for example, have generated scores of insights about how parties may behave in a 
way that diverges (at least in some degree) with rational actor models. In our 
framework, it would be possible to introduce behavioral biases into the learning 
process in several ways. For instance, there is growing evidence that even 
sophisticated parties tend to deviate from strict Bayesian reasoning when assessing 
their environments, often placing “too much” weight on their own prior 
 
156 We note that in related work, Jennejohn et al. were not able to find strong evidence of tradeoffs 
between RTFs and pandemic carveouts. See Jennejohn, Matthew and Nyarko, Julian and Talley, 
Eric L., COVID-19 as a Force Majeure in Corporate Transactions (April 1, 2020). Columbia Law 
and Economics Working Paper No. 625, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577701. In the light of 
our framework, this observation casts doubt on the extent to which efficient non-price ‘horse 
trading’ occurs in this context (at least as related to RTFs). 
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experiences, assuming them to be representative of the larger class.157  Such non-
Bayesian reasoning could well induce a type of “local lock-in” effects in which 
certain firms tend to push a contract mutation, while other clusters tend to hold fast 
to the traditional term. Inquiries such as this represent an interesting and potentially 
fertile area to generalize and deploy our framework. Although we leave them for 
future endeavors, we note that a pre-condition to even beginning to incorporate 
such biases is the existence of a holistic framework for thinking about how and 
when contract terms evolve—and this Article has provided just such a framework. 
Conclusion 
When Tiffany and LVMH triumphantly announced their acquisition 
agreement in late 2019, they did so at a moment that we would soon come to 
identify as the temporal dividing line between the “before times” and our post-
pandemic world. Although such watershed moments are (fortunately) infrequent, 
they also create an opportunity for scholars to consider whether and how 
commercial practices evolve as such events unfold and potentially change the rules 
of the game. In so doing, such practices can also change law.  
In this Article, we have used our current watershed moment in history as an 
invitation to analyze more rigorously how contracting practices evolve over time in 
the context of a changing environment. We have developed and analyzed a holistic 
model of contract term evolution that delivers insights about how economics, 
information, learning, and lawyering interact to shape contracting practices—and 
in the process to change law. These insights, moreover, can be directly compared 
to measurable empirical trends in contract practices, which we document using two 
decades’ worth of mergers and acquisitions contract terms. This comparison 
suggests that term diffusion and evolution is not a monolithic phenomenon, but 
instead unfolds in a variety of ways that varies considerably by context. While some 
trends bear the markers of efficient markets, others appear to manifest behavior 
more consistent of other patterns, such as cascades or black holes. And in turn, our 
analysis allows us to situate many of the stylized accounts of term evolution as 
special cases of our more general framework. 
Although our study contributes to a more systematic accounting of the 
literature on contract term evolution, it also can be easily extended to take on other 
phenomena not examined here. We have posited a few such applications, including 
using our framework to assess whether complex contract negotiation displays 
features of “bartering,” where concessions on non-price terms are traded off, rather 
than accounted for in the price. Our analysis can also help open up a more general 
and testable theory of when and how behavioral biases affect contracting trends, 
and whether countervailing forces are able to counteract them. Much of where these 
extensions ultimately lead has yet to be seen. But we conjecture that in many such 
applications, it is likely that contracting—and not love—will ultimately prevail. 
 
157 See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (2000); Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430 
(1972). 
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Appendix A: Formal Analysis of Model 
 
For more technically minded readers, this Appendix presents in a more formal 
fashion the model outlined informally in the main text.  There are five key sets of 
assumptions that frame this inquiry. They are summarized as follows: 
1. Non-price terms constitute a central vehicle through which negotiating 
parties are able to “make value” in a contractual setting. 
 
2. Most of the negotiation over and search for such non-price terms is done by 
attorneys outside the firm who are specialists in negotiating deals on behalf 
of their clients, but are not directly supervised by their clients. 
 
3. In negotiating a non-price term, counsel typically start with a default “status 
quo” term, and then consider whether an alteration to that status quo term – 
what we refer to as a “mutation” – should replace it. 
 
4. Counsel will adopt the mutation only if they consider it to be value 
enhancing to a sufficient degree.  
 
5. Counsel bargain about whether to adopt the mutation using two sources of 
information: 
• First, they have some (imperfect) ability to discern whether the deal in 
front of them is a better “fit” with the status quo term or the mutation 
• Second, counsel bring to the table a set of experiences from prior deals 
they have negotiated, which they can collectively look to in order to 
benchmark their inklings about the current deal. This includes the prior 
experience of counsel in adopting (or rejecting) the mutation. 
Each of these assumptions is, we believe, defensible for reasons described in Part 
II. We formalize each of them below within an environment that we make as simple 
as possible while still capturing the steps articulated above. In walking through the 
analysis below, we will frequently illustrate each intermediate outcome by 
imposing the numerical values from our benchmark simulations in Part 2C of the 
text (pictured in Figure 1).  
 
B. Deal Sequence and Population of Firms 
 
Our model unfolds dynamically, over discrete time increments denoted by 𝑡 ∈
{1,2,3… }.  In each period t, a potential acquisition deal emerges involving a buyer 
“b” who values the asset at 𝑣" > 0 and a seller “s” who values it at 𝑣# > 0 (where 
these values are benchmarked against a deal that is executed pursuant to 
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conventional standard-form contract). The realized values of 𝑣" and 𝑣# are drawn 
randomly from a distribution function 𝐹(𝑣" , 𝑣#). The buyer and seller observe these 
values and pursue a transaction only if 𝑣" > 𝑣#; and thus in the most general setting 
there can be some periods in which there is deal struck. For purposes of our 
benchmark analysis, however, we will assume that each potential transaction yields 
a deal with probability 1.    
     To execute a deal, the buyer and seller each must work with outside legal 
counsel. Their choices must be taken from a universe of N law firms, indexed by i 
= 1,2,…N. Each firm is associated with a (scaler) “reputational capital” value, 
which we denote by the indexed variable 𝜃$, and which we normalize to be 
somewhere between 0 and 1. The N-dimensional vector of reputations is denoted 
𝛩 ≡ {𝜃$ , 𝜃$,… 𝜃%}. For each period’s transaction (i.e., a consummating buyer-seller 
pair) the parties must select two different law firms to represent them from the 
population. We represent this pairing process to unfold according to a probabilistic 





























Each row of the matrix corresponds to the firm representing the buyer, and each 
column represents the firm representing the seller. We keep the structure of 𝑃 
deliberately general at this stage, other than to require that all entries on the diagonal 
must be zero (no law firm is allowed to represent both buyers and sellers 
simultaneously), and its remaining components must sum to 1. Thus, for example, 
the component probabilities might be scaled to firm reputational capital.  
In our benchmark analysis, we will assume that there are 10 firms, each of 
which has identical reputational capital of ½. Consequently, the probabilistic 
assignment matrix is effectively random among the firms, and thus each non-
diagonal element represents one permutation of distinct assignment of the firms to 
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Figure A1 conceptually lays a representative transaction occurring at period t that 
is assigned to two specific firms in the eligible population (one for the buyer and 
one for the seller). Each circle in the figure represents an individual law firm; in 
period t a transaction arrives and is assigned to representative law firms i and j 
(colored red for the buyer’s counsel and green for the seller’s counsel) with 
probability 𝑝$,* as described above. 
 
Figure A1: Transaction assignment in each period t 
 
C. Non-price term selection 
As noted above, each transaction arrives in the hands of the law firms with 
a default set of off-the-rack contract terms presumptively apply to the deal. Such 
“status quo” terms, for example, may be those embedded in ABA model 
agreements or other well-known market templates in the field. That said, once the 
counsel have received a deal to execute, the legal teams can choose in negotiating 
whether to (a) follow the conventional contract terms or (b) adopt a “mutation” that 
is inconsistent with convention.  
To fix ideas, we suppose that the mutation will either increase or decrease 
the payoffs of both buyers and sellers by some fixed amount 𝛼 > 0. Whether the 
mutation increases or decreases both parties’ payoffs, however, may not be certain 
at the time of contracting, and we assume transactions come in one of two flavors. 
For the first (which we call “Type 1” denoted T1) the mutation is value destroying, 
and each party loses 𝛼 if the mutation is adopted. For the other flavor (which we 
call “Type 2” denoted T2), the mutation is value enhancing and each party gains 𝛼. 
Thus, if the buyer and seller accurately identify which type of transaction they are 
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facing, adopting an efficient non-price term (the conventional term or the mutation) 
is straightforward.158 
We assume, however, that such identification is not always possible (at least 
with precision). In our framework, the attorneys (and possibly even clients) have 
imperfect information about whether their transaction is a T1 or T2 transaction, and 
thus the best they can do is to assess a probabilistic likelihood about this critical 
piece of information. In making this assessment, transactional lawyers will draw on 
three pieces of information: (a) their prior beliefs about the overall representation 
of T1 and T2 deals; (b) their (potentially inaccurate) assessment of the type of the 
transaction they are negotiating; and (c) their collective experience in adopting (or 
rejecting) the mutation term in prior transactions.  We address each of these below 
in the succeeding subsections. 
Before doing so, however, we first observe that because the parties are 
bargaining with symmetric (albeit imperfect) information, they will adopt the 
mutation if and only if – given their joint information at the time of bargaining, the 
mutation seems likely to bring about an increase in expected value with some 
critical probability (which we denote as q). Consequently, the decision about 
whether each bargaining team at time t will adopt the mutation turns on the 
information they have at the time about its net benefits (relative to the conventional 
term). This information set is the core vehicle through which actors learn in our 
model. In all our benchmark simulations, we will assume that q=½, and thus the 
parties will adopt the mutation whenever it increases joint expected payoffs.159 
We now proceed to describe the means by which the parties learn about 
transactions over time and from one another. 
 
Prior Beliefs 
We start with the parties’ a priori beliefs, which effectively reduce to the 
assessed likelihood that a randomly selected transaction is T1 or T2.  This 
probabilistic assessment, of course, must be directly related to the proportion of 
potential deals that are of each type in the population.  (For example, of 60% of the 
deals in the population of potential deals were T1, then it’s pretty clear that a 
randomly selected deal from the population would have a 60% likelihood of being 
T1 and a 40% likelihood of being T2.) That said within our framework, even this 
proportion is not known with certainty. Rather, we suppose that the “true” 
 
158 This approach to a mutation is obviously a simplification, since many (if not most) alterations to 
non-price terms seem likely to hurt one player and help the other. Such a caveat is easily 
accommodated in our framework at the cost of some additional notation. For example, our 
framework can be adapted to the situation where the “mutation” actually consists of dual changes 
to two non-price terms--one of which helps the seller and the other of which helps the buyer. Under 
this account, the parties will “horse trade” to implement the dual changes if their joint effect is 
expected to be mutually beneficial. In such a scenario, one could reinterpret the value of to represent 
the joint gains from the dual mutation.] 
159 If the parties are risk averse, the cutoff value for q might be larger than ½. Our framework easily 
accommodates this possibility. 
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population characteristics could be skewed in either direction, so that a 𝛥% fraction 
of the potential transactions are either T1 or T2, where 𝛥 is a fixed parameter value 
such that 𝛥 < 50%. More formally, if we let random variable Z denote the fraction 
of transactions that are T1 (and thus the complementary fraction (1-Z) are T2), then 
we suppose that there are two possible configurations to the world: Either 
(𝑍, 1 − 𝑍) = (𝛥, 1 − 𝛥), or  (𝑍, 1 − 𝑍) = (1 − 𝛥, 𝛥). Significantly, however, the 
parties are uncertain about the realization of Z, and thus they do not know whether 
the 𝛥 proportion applies to T1 deals (so that the majority (1 − 𝛥)% of deals are of 
type T2) or to the T2 deals (so that the majority (1 − 𝛥)% of deals are type T1). 
Which of these alternative situations constitutes the “ground truth” cannot be 
resolved with certainty. But we assume that all players begin with a common 
population-wide “prior” probability about the world as follows: 
𝑃𝑟 {𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑜𝑓	𝑇1	𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 	𝛥} 	= 𝑟!	 (3) 
𝑃𝑟 {𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑜𝑓	𝑇1	𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 	1 − 𝛥} 	= 1 − 𝑟!	 (4) 
In other words, all parties believe that T1 deals constitute the majority of 
transactions with probability 1 − 𝑟!, and a minority of transactions with probability 
𝑟!. And conversely, they believe that T2 deals constitute the majority of 
transactions with probability 𝑟! and a minority of transactions with probability 
1 − 𝑟!.  Although nothing in our model requires it, we will initially assume that the 
conventional contract terms are there for a reason – and the parties a priori 
assessment is that 𝑟! < 1/2, indicating that the most transactions are believed to be 
T1. Equivalently, then, the “conventional” term is initially is believed to be the most 
appropriate provision for “most” transactions.  In our benchmark simulation we 
will assume that 𝑟! = 0.05, and that the relative percentage composition of T1 and 
T2 firms is 30% and 70%, so that 𝛥 = 0.3. Thus, in the benchmark case, one-in-
twenty chance that the mutation enjoys the 70-30 majority of potential deals, and a 
nineteen-in-twenty chance that the 70-30 split favors the conventional term.  
The process is illustrated in Figure A2, which visually depicts this prior 
belief process as well as the “true” state of play. In the figure, chance determines 
whether T1 deals (shown in red) constitute a majority (1 − 𝛥)% of the population, 
or a minority 𝛥%. The corresponding probabilities that T2 deals (shown in orange) 
are in the majority is 𝑟!, and respectively in the minority is (1 − 𝑟!).  As can be 
seen from the figure, only if T1 deals are in the minority and T2 deals are in the 
minority (the left-hand branch) will the mutation be, on average, value enhancing. 
If instead T1 deals are in the majority (the right branch), the conventional term will 
be (on average) the most efficient.  The transaction that emerges is assumed to be 
a random draw from the resulting Population of Deals (whatever the ground-truth 
reality is on the mix of T1 and T2 representation).  
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Figure A2: Sequence and Information Structure 
 
Absent any additional information, then, the parties would have to rely on 
their overall prior beliefs about the population averages to determine whether the 
standard term or the mutation is appropriate. And if 𝑟! = 0.05 <  ½, as our 
benchmark example assumes, then they would never adopt the mutation.  If, on the 
other hand, counsel could also draw on additional information that is probative of 
the deal before them, then their prior beliefs would inform – but would not fully 
determine – the contractual term chosen.  How exactly the firm weights prior beliefs 
against deal-specific information is described below. 
 
Assessment of Instant Transaction 
In addition to their prior beliefs, the transacting parties also are able to 
assess certain “noisy” facts about the specific transaction before them, effectively 
obtaining an informative signal about which type of transaction they are 
negotiating. If this signal were 100 percent accurate, then it would overwhelm prior 
beliefs to the parties in structuring their contract, since it would allow them to 
design a contract that is a perfect fit to the type of deal.  On the other hand, if the 
signal is noisy, or the parties sometimes make mistakes in interpreting the signal 
incorrectly, then they would tend to combine the content of the signal with their 
prior beliefs in a way to make an “all-things-considered” assessment of whether the 
mutation or the conventional term is warranted. 
Thus, when a new transaction arrives and buyer’s / seller’s counsel are 
selected, they jointly observe a noisy signal as to whether their particular deal is T1 
or T2; denote the possible signal realizations as t1 and t2, where 𝛾 ∈ (½, 1) 
embodies the signal’s precision as per the following conditional probability table:  
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↓Signal Observed  \  True Type→  T1 T2 
t1 𝛾 1 − 𝛾	
t2 1 − 𝛾	 𝛾	
Table A1: Deal-Specific Signals and True Deal Types (Precision=g) 
Note that when 𝛾 = 1 the signal is perfect, and thus the parties know precisely 
which type of deal they have before them. In contrast, when 𝛾 = 1/2 the signal is 
wholly uninformative, and the parties cannot use it to refine their beliefs about the 
transaction.  For intermediate values of 𝛾 between ½ and 1, the signal is not partially 
informative, and the parties may use it (along with other information) to inform 
their beliefs.  In our benchmark example, we will assume that 𝛾 = 0.6, so that the 
observed individual signal about the transaction is accurate 60 percent of the time 
and incorrect 40 percent of the time. 
 
Prior Experience of Transacting Law Firms 
Finally, our framework presumes (like the real world) that counsel are 
repeat players in deal structuring, and therefore bring their prior experiences and 
wisdom to the table. In particular, in addition to prior beliefs and their signal about 
the instant transaction described above, counsel are also able to look back to 
previous deals in order to refine further their experiential knowledge about the 
population, giving them added knowledge about when the mutation is (and is not) 
likely to be a good fit. Here, we assume that, for purposes of the instant transaction, 
counsel for buyer and seller are able to pool the signals they have individually 
received from recent prior deals that their firms have negotiated. Such information 
would not be generally available to the public, but instead is housed in the 
“institutional memory” of the transacting firms.  Here, we suppose that each side’s 
legal team is able to look backwards a given number of periods that have transpired, 
considering the deals (if any) that they have played a role in negotiating. We denote 
the “look-back” period by the integer variable L; for the buyer’s counsel, we denote 
Yb as the number of deals counsel was involved in during the look-back period, with 
kb of those deals involving the observation of the “t1” signal. Similarly, for the 
seller’s counsel, we denote Ys as the prior deals participated in during the look-back 
period, with ks representing the number of times buyer’s counsel has observed the 
“t1” signal in those deals. At the negotiation table, counsel pool their collection of 
observations (adjusting as necessary the counts for any prior deals when the two 
firms negotiated with each other and thus observed the same signals). This process 
results in what is effectively a “joint” experiential data set for the negotiating 
parties, consisting of 𝑌 prior deals where the signal t1 appeared 𝑘 times.160  
Although the values of Y and k will be dependent on the random matching of firms, 
 
160 In all our simulations, we accounted for the possibility that the two law firms may have shared 
prior common deals, taking pains to avoid “double-counting” such experiences. 
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we assume in our benchmark model that counsel is able to look to the beginning of 
the simulation. 
 
Updated Posterior Beliefs 
The three pieces of information noted above – prior beliefs (𝑟!), a noisy 
signal about the instant transaction (𝛾), and pooled information from prior 
transactions (𝑌, 𝑘) – allow the parties to refine and update their beliefs about the 
optimal term for the transaction they are negotiating.  In doing so, our baseline 
framework assumes that the parties use “Bayes rule” to combine these pieces of 
information.161 
Consider first how the parties might combine only their prior beliefs and 
their pooled information (disregarding the contribution of the signal they observe 
about the instant transaction). Here, applying Bayes rule, it is straightforward to 
confirm that the parties would have the following interim beliefs about the 
population-wide ratio of mutation-favoring contracts: 
?̂?(𝑟!, 𝛾, 𝑌, 𝑘) =
𝑟!
𝑟! + (1 − 𝑟!) ]
1 − 𝛾 − 𝛥 + 2𝛥𝛾
𝛾 + 𝛥 − 2𝛥𝛾 ^
+)(, 	 (5) 
Although this interim belief does not yet incorporate anything about the 
signal that pertains to the instant deal (which we turn to below), a few things are 
worth pointing out. First, when the contracting parties have prior experiences in 
negotiating this type of deal (so that 𝑌 = 0 and 𝑘 = 0), the expression simplifies to 
?̂?(0,0) = 𝑟!. This makes sense, because a lack of prior experience implies that the 
best information the negotiating parties have is their ex ante priors. Similarly, note 
that when the signals the parties observed from past deals are extremely imprecise 
(𝛾= ½), the expression similarly simplifies to ?̂?(𝑟!, ½, 𝑌, 𝑘) = 𝑟!. This also is 
intuitive, since it means that the parties can learn nothing from their data set of prior 
signals. Finally, note that when 𝑟! takes on extreme values of 0 or 1 (so that the 
parties have irrebuttably strong prior beliefs), no amount of prior experience will 
shake them from that view. Finally, note that in our benchmark model, this 
expression simplifies somewhat after plugging in the assumed values of 𝑟! and 𝛾: 
?̂?(𝑌, 𝑘) =
1
1 + 19 ]2327^
+)(, 	 (6) 
Now consider how the signal observed about the actual deal in front of the 
parties is combined with the probabilistic assessment from equation (4) of 
mutation-favoring deals.  Because the signal reveals tailored information about the 
specific deal at issue, the parties would generate different “posterior” beliefs about 
whether the signal suggested a T1 deal (with signal t1) or a T2 deal (with signal t2). 
We can once again apply Bayes rule to each type of signal, as follows. If signal 𝜏1 
 
161 A definition and explanation of Bayes rule is provided in note 65, supra. 
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1 + ]1 − 𝛾𝛾 ^ ]
?̂? + 𝛥 − 2𝛥?̂?
1 + 2𝛥?̂? − ?̂? − 𝛥^
						 (7) 
Conversely, if signal 𝑡2 was observed, then the parties’ posterior beliefs that the 
current deal is T1 are given by 𝜋(: 
{𝑡2, ?̂?} 		=
	1
1 + ] 𝛾1 − 𝛾^ ]
?̂? + 𝛥 − 2𝛥?̂?
1 + 2𝛥?̂? − ?̂? − 𝛥^
						 (8) 
Note that the only difference between these two posterior beliefs is the inversion of 
the likelihood ratio ]&)-
-
^ in the denominator.  And, because 𝛾 > &
(
, it follows that 
𝜋& > 𝜋(, implying (intuitively) that the parties’ belief about a T1 transaction 
(favoring the status quo term) should increase if they observe signal t1, and 













Given the information that they assembled through experience and direct 
observation, the parties will favor the mutation over the conventional term only if 
their posterior belief indicates that the likelihood of a T2 deal is “sufficiently 
strong.” Although we will explore alternative definitions of that concept below, we 
suppose for now that the key criterion is a “more likely than not” criterion (which 
would coincide with designing a contract that is efficient in expectation). In some 
cases, the parties joint experience may be so strong that it overwhelms anything 
they might learn from the deal-specific signal they receive. In other cases, the signal 
is dispositive.  Figure A3 illustrates this point focusing on the strength of the parties' 
collective “prior” beliefs, or ?̂?, based on their collective experiences. Note that 
when these beliefs strongly suggest that mutation-friendly deals are rare (?̂? < 𝜌 <
&
(
), the parties will generally favor the standard term regardless of the signal. In 
contrast, when their beliefs strongly suggest that the mutation-friendly deals are 
very common (?̂? > 𝜌 > &
(
), then they will similarly favor the mutation regardless 
of the signal. When their prior beliefs are more moderate, however (𝜌 < ?̂? < 𝜌), 
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the parties’ choice of term will hinge on the signal they observe (with t1 favoring 
the conventional term and t2 favoring the mutation).162	
 
Figure A3: Joint beliefs and signal dependence 
In our benchmark model, this set of tradeoffs can be easily illustrated using 
Figure A4. The horizontal axis denotes the updated beliefs, ?̂?, that the parties have 
coming into bargaining based on their joint prior transactions (per equations 7-8 
above). The blue line denotes the posterior assessment they would have that the 
transaction is a T1 transaction after having observed a t1 signal, while the orange 
line denotes the posterior beliefs that the transaction is T1 having observed a t2 
signal. Note that if their updated beliefs are below approximately ?̂? = 0.17, the 
parties will always adopt the conventional term regardless of signal. Conversely, if 
their updated beliefs are above a cutoff of approximately ?̂? = 0.75, they will always 
adopt the mutation. For intermediate values, their signal dictates the transaction 
they enter into. 
 
Figure A4: Interim and Posterior Beliefs, and Term Adoption (Benchmark Case) 
 
Collecting all the insights from above, we arrive at the following proposition: 
 
Proposition: Consider a pair of negotiating parties at round t with joint signal 
history ⟨𝑘; 𝑁⟩ as derived above. The parties will choose the relevant non-price 
contract term as follows: 
 
162 It is easily confirmed that =γ-1-2 and 1-γ-1-2. 
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• If ?̂? > 𝜌, the mutation is chosen regardless of the signal observed. 
• If ?̂? < 𝜌, the conventional term is chosen regardless of the signal observed. 
• If 𝜌 < ?̂? < 𝜌), the mutation is chosen if and only if the parties observe signal 
t2,  
where 𝜌 = -).
&)(.




The expressions from the above proposition drive each of our simulation paths 
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